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“HALLOWED BY HISTORY, BUT NOT BY
REASON”: JUDGE RAKOFF’S CRITIQUE OF THE




Over the past several years, in a trilogy of opinions,1 Judge Jed
S. Rakoff of the United States District Court of the Southern Dis-
trict of New York has established himself as a minor cult hero for
daring to question the wisdom of the long-running consent judg-
ment practice of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”
or “Commission”).2 At its core, each opinion addresses issues of
affinity for settlement, judicial deference to the judgments of ad-
ministrative agencies, and the general theory of damages in cases
† Distinguished Lecturer, City University of New York. The Author would like to
thank Frank Macchiarola, Sam Rivera, Joel Townsend, Eric Washer, Tom Akyali,
Danny Alicea, and Christine Ortiz. This Article is dedicated to the memory of Frank J.
Macchiarola. His presence is missed, but his inspiration endures.
1 See Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Bank of Am. Corp. (Bank of America Opinion I), 653 F.
Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp.,
771 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Citigroup Global Markets
Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
2 See, e.g., Matthew Farrell, Note, A Role for the Judiciary in Reforming Executive Com-
pensation: The Implications of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Bank of America, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 169, 189 (2010) (describing Judge Rakoff as a “maverick”); Ed Koch,
Judge Jed Rakoff—A Light Unto His Fellow Jurists, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2011, 12:05
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ed-koch/judge-jed-rakoff-a-light-_b_1130133.
html (characterizing the Judge as “a light unto his fellow jurists”); Steven Pearlstein,
What Kind of Judge Stands Up for Truth and Justice?, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2009, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/15/AR2009091503498.
html (calling Judge Rakoff “the kind of activist judge we need more of”); John Cas-
sidy, Why Judge Rakoff Was Right to Block the Citigroup Settlement, THE NEW YORKER RA-
TIONAL IRRATIONALITY BLOG (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/online/
blogs/johncassidy/2011/11/why-judge-rakoff-was-right-to-block-the-citigroup-settle
ment.html (commenting that Judge Rakoff “did the American public a great ser-
vice.”); Jordan Weissmann, Why Populist Hero Judge Rakoff Could Help Wall Street Win,
THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 1, 2011, 4:23 PM, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2011/12/why-populist-hero-judge-rakoff-could-help-wall-street-win/249366/ (observ-
ing that the Judge “has the makings of a perfect hero”); Frederick J. Sheehan, The
SEC’s Day in Court, FINANCIAL SENSE (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.financialsense.com/
contributors/fred-sheehan/2011/12/01/the-sec-day-in-court (describing the judge as
“fighting for the common man”); David Bario, With Latest Ruling, Rakoff Cements Status
as Populist Firebrand, AMLAW DAILY (Nov. 28, 2011, 4:12 PM), http://amlawdaily.
typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/11/rakoff-as-populist-firebrand.html (describing the
Judge as a “populist firebrand”).
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of corporate malfeasance.3 While commentators have focused am-
ple attention on the high-profile nature, appealing facts, or color-
ful judicial language4 of each of the controversies, the value of the
Judge’s opinions is found elsewhere—in the basic issues he dares
to confront regarding the proper role of the courts in validating
and enforcing the special kind of settlement known as the consent
judgment.5 The Judge’s rumblings uncover a practice “hallowed by
history, but not by reason”6 and his work sheds light on a curious
corner of the Commission’s maneuvering too long unexamined
and unquestioned out of deference, convenience, apathy, or some
combination thereof. If sunlight indeed remains the best disinfec-
tant, Judge Rakoff’s series of opinions offers the industry and its
primary regulator a refreshing opportunity for introspection, as
each embarks on a proper cleansing.7 There remains, however, a
significant difference between a good wash and a whitewash.8 And,
as Judge Rakoff notes, “in any case . . . that touches on the trans-
parency of financial markets whose gyrations have so depressed our
economy and debilitated our lives, there is an overriding public
3 M. Todd Henderson, Impact of the Rakoff Ruling: Was the Judge’s Scuttling of the
SEC/BofA Settlement Legally Pointless or Incredibly Important—or Both?, WALL STREET LAW-
YER, Nov. 2009, at 4.
4 See, e.g., James F. Haggerty, Judge Rakoff, Citigroup, and the Upside of Saying ‘Sorry’,
CORPORATE COUNSEL (Dec. 7, 2011) (suggesting that “[c]ommentators have focused
on the strong language of the opinion”); see also Alison Frankel, Rakoff to SEC: Oh Yes,
It is My Job to Consider Public Interest, REUTERS, Nov. 28, 2011, http://newsandin-
sight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/11_-_November/Rakoff_to_SEC__
Oh_yes,_it_is_my_job_to_consider_public_interest/ (describing the Citigroup Global
Markets, Inc. opinion as an “eminently quotable exercise in rhetoric”).
5 See Rakoff Rakes the SEC, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/arti
cle/SB10001424052970203917304574413242609077958.html (observing that “Judge
Rakoff has done a public service by exposing the political point-scoring that drives far
too many regulatory actions”); see also Michael C. Macchiarola, In Respect of Resistance to
the “Rubber Stamp,” ASU LAW BLOG (Apr. 19, 2012), http://asulawjournal.lawnews-asu.
org/?p=422. Unless otherwise explained, the terms “consent decree” and “consent
judgment” are used interchangeably throughout this Article.
6 Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 328,
332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
7 See generally Louis Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WEEKLY, Dec. 20,
1913, at 10; see also Knut A. Rostad, Rakoff’s Bank of America Opinion: “The Tipping Point”
ADVISORONE (Sept. 16, 2009), http://www.advisorone.com/2009/09/16/rakoffs-bank
-of-america-opinion-the-tipping-point (asserting that “Judge Rakoff’s total rejection of
the settlement frames, far more powerfully than any argument to date, the moral basis
for reform in compelling terms that resonate with ordinary investors”).
8 See, e.g., A Financial Regulator Under Fire: Unsettling Wall Street, THE ECONOMIST,
Dec. 3, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21541055 [hereinafter THE ECONO-
MIST] (agreeing that “before a suitable punishment can be set, there must be a deter-
mination as to what occurred, and why it was wrong” and adding that “[o]f such
sentiments are revolutions born”).
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interest in knowing the truth.”9
This Article proceeds, in five parts, to examine each of the
three relevant opinions. Part I summarizes each controversy and
articulates Judge Rakoff’s critique of the Commission’s settlement
practice. This part lays the predicate for the analysis that follows.
Part II describes the history of the consent judgment practice at
the Commission and examines the motivations and developments
that have made it all too convenient for the Commission and de-
fendants to routinely favor settlement. This part of the Article also
surveys the surprisingly scant literature and precedent that exist on
the subject and examines the indispensible role that the courts
have come to play in the Commission’s settlement practice. Part III
examines the wisdom of a policy that favors settlements generally
and investigates the proper deference that a court owes an admin-
istrative agency proposing a settlement. This part highlights the va-
rious issues raised by the Commission’s current affinity for
settlement and suggests that a more active role for courts is both
necessary and responsible in cases where the Commission seeks ju-
dicial enforcement powers to assist in the monitoring of wrongdo-
ers post-settlement. Also, this part explores the role that a “public
interest” inquiry plays as an appropriate judicial check on the
SEC’s settlement practice. Part IV briefly explores the anticipated
results of this issue’s newfound attention and theorizes as to the
likely effects on the Commission’s ongoing practice of gaining set-
tlements. Finally, Part V offers a short conclusion.
I. THREE CONTROVERSIES WITH A COMMON THREAD
Judge Rakoff has been “publicly stewing over the SEC’s ap-
proach to settlements with alleged Wall Street malefactors since
2009.”10 While each of the cases examined here has unique facts
and circumstances, a common thread binds the three. Together,
they shed light on a long running and unchecked practice.11 More
than the simple musings of a frustrated judge, the opinions are
thoughtful and measured, and reveal deep inconsistencies and
troubling assumptions in the Commission’s use of the courts as en-
forcement partner.12 In each case, the Judge objects to the Com-
mission’s taking the judiciary for granted—involving the court as
9 Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335.
10 See Bario, supra note 2.
11 See, e.g., THE ECONOMIST, supra note 8 (describing the settlement practice as one
of the SEC’s “pet habits”).
12 See, e.g., Brief of Appointed Pro Bono Counsel for the United States District
Court at 1, Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d
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an ongoing monitor without providing a full accounting of the un-
derlying facts triggering such a necessity.13 The Judge’s concerns
are straightforward. Absent an adequate appraisal, it remains
nearly impossible for a court to determine (i) its proper role in
such an arrangement or (ii) whether the public interest is served
by its ongoing involvement. And, “before a suitable punishment
can be set, there must be a determination as to what occurred, and
why it was wrong.”14 As one commentator has observed, the entire
process takes on “an Alice-in-Wonderland aspect” when a company
subjects itself to disgorgement or monetary penalty and “routinely
says it won’t in the future violate the regulations it did not admit to
violating in the first place.”15
At the same time, allowing the judiciary an unfettered role in
rewriting or second-guessing each and every Commission settle-
ment would be equally unsatisfactory. Such a regime would frus-
trate the Commission’s work and impart a substantial burden on its
efforts to calculate the costs and benefits of the various enforce-
ment strategies at its disposal. Moreover, without clearly defining
the scope of judicial inquiry, the Commission and its targets would
be forced to bargain with the prospect of eventual judicial interfer-
ence hanging in the air. Such a regime might also prove unsatisfac-
tory for the judiciary itself, as additional hearings, testimony, and
review processes of all proposed Commission settlements would
clog already full federal judicial dockets.16
Cir. 2012) (Nos. 11-5227-CV(L), 11-5375-CV(CON), 11-5242-CV(XAP)), 2012 WL
3288769 [hereinafter SEC Brief]. The brief stated:
The district court, asked to approve a problematic consent judgment
that included a request for substantial injunctive relief enforced by the
court’s own contempt power, held that the proposed consent judgment
could not meet the acknowledged standards of judicial review where the
court had not been provided with any evidentiary basis upon which to
exercise its independent judgment.
Id.
13 One particularly colorful description of this objection suggested that the Judge
did not want to be treated as a “potted plant.” See Roger Parloff, The Judge Who Slapped
Citi, FORTUNE, Nov. 30, 2011, http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2011/11/30/judge-
jed-rakoff-citigroup-sec/.
14 See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 8.
15 Neal Lipschutz, Hear Out the SEC Guy, Too, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Dec 5, 2011,
11:24 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/12/05/hear-out-the-sec-guy-too/; see also
Matt Taibbi, Federal Judge Pimp-Slaps the SEC Over Citigroup Settlement, ROLLING STONE
TAIBBLOG (Nov. 29, 2011, 10:10 AM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/
taibblog/federal-judge-pimp-slaps-the-sec-over-citigroup-settlement-20111129 (“By ac-
cepting hundred-million-dollar fines without a full public venting of the facts, the SEC
is leveling seemingly significant punishments without telling the public what the de-
fendant is being punished for.”).
16 Samantha Dreilinger, Is Three a Crowd? The Role of the Courts in SEC Settlements, 7
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Judge Rakoff has drawn attention to a corner of the world
where the roles of the judiciary and the Commission routinely in-
tersect. And, his opinions have dared to ask some basic questions
about the proper role of each in the process of negotiating and
enforcing settlements with corporate wrongdoers. His opinions
highlight that the judiciary has, for too long, offered little in the
way of a meaningful check on the settlements of the SEC. Today,
however, more work is required—to define more exactly the scope
of the proper judicial inquiry into the Commission’s arrangements
and to ensure that judicial force is not employed in anything other
than a highly deliberative and responsible manner.
The particular facts and histories of the three relevant cases
follow.
A. SEC v. Bank of America
On August 3, 2009, the SEC filed a complaint against Bank of
America Corporation (“BofA”) in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York.17 The Commission alleged
that BofA had made materially false and misleading statements in
its proxy statement seeking shareholder approval of the $50 billion
acquisition of Merrill Lynch (“Merrill”).18 Specifically, the Commis-
sion alleged that BofA violated Section 14 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and the accompanying Rules 14a–3 and 14a–9,
as a result of its failure to adequately disclose information about
Merill’s payment of year-end bonuses.19 BofA’s proxy claimed that
Merrill had agreed not to pay year-end performance bonuses or
other discretionary incentive compensation to its executives prior
to the closing of the merger without BofA’s consent.20 In fact, BofA
(2010), http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=saman
tha_dreilinger.
17 Bank of America Opinion I, 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). An
amended complaint was filed on October 19, 2009. In addition, the Commission filed
a complaint, on January 12, 2010, alleging that Bank of America failed to adequately
disclose, in connection with the proxy solicitation for the Merrill acquisition, informa-
tion concerning Merrill’s losses for the fourth quarter of 2008.
18 Id. For a vivid description of the circumstances surrounding the Merrill Lynch
acquisition, see Heidi N. Moore, Bank of America-Merrill Lynch: A $50 Billion Deal from
Hell, WALL ST. J. DEAL JOURNAL BLOG (Jan. 22, 2009, 2:16 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
deals/2009/01/22/bank-of-america-merrill-lynch-a-50-billion-deal-from-hell/; see also
GREG FARRELL, CRASH OF THE TITANS (2010) (describing the events leading to Mer-
rill’s need for a takeover).
19 Bank of America Opinion I, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 508.
20 See Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, Notice of Special Meeting of Stockhold-
ers (Form 424(B)(3)) (Oct. 31, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ed
gar/data/70858/000095012308014233/g15211b3e424b3.htm.
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had already agreed that Merrill could pay up to $5.8 billion21 in
discretionary year-end and other bonuses to Merrill executives for
2008.22 Under the terms of the consent judgment proposed to the
court, BofA, while not admitting or denying the Commission’s spe-
cific allegations, agreed to (i) pay a $33 million fine to the Com-
mission and (ii) refrain from making false and misleading
statements in future proxy solicitations.23 On September 14, 2009,
in a colorfully worded opinion, Judge Rakoff rejected a proposed
consent judgment that would have settled the matter.24
Lest there be any doubt about the gravity with which Judge
Rakoff would consider whether the proposed consent judgment
was acceptable, his September 14th order framed the issue in no
uncertain terms:
In other words, the parties were proposing that the manage-
ment of Bank of America—having allegedly hidden from the
Bank’s shareholders that as much as $5.8 billion of their money
would be given as bonuses to the executives of Merrill who had
run the company nearly into bankruptcy—would now settle the
legal consequences of their lying by paying the S.E.C. $33 mil-
lion more of their shareholder’s money.25
After taking particular issue with the notion that “the victims
of the violation pay an additional penalty for their own victimiza-
tion,” Judge Rakoff ordered written submissions and oral argu-
ments on the subject.26
Of the three cases examined in this Article, the BofA situation
seems to be the most egregious example of the consent decree
gone wild. The underlying facts of the case make the proposed set-
tlement almost indefensible. And, the court soundly rejected the
21 Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Bank of Am. Corp., (Bank of America Opinion II) 09 CIV.
6829 (JSR), 2010 WL 624581 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010). This amount represented
nearly 12% of the “approximately $50 billion” of total consideration exchanged in the
merger. See generally, Final Consent Judgment as to Defendant Bank of America Cor-
poration, Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Bank of America Corp., 677 F. Supp.2d 717
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Nos. 09 Civ. 6829 (JSR), 10 Civ. 0215 (JSR)), 2010 WL 430122.
22 Bank of America Opinion I, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 508.
23 Id.
24 See id.; see also Kara Scannell, Liz Rappaport & Jess Bravin, Judge Tosses Out Bonus
Deal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1252944939769090
51.html.
25 Bank of America Opinion I, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 508; see also Jonathan R. Macey, The
Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 33 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 639, 654 (2010) (observing that “Judge Rakoff left no ambiguity about the
SEC’s self-interest in agreeing to settle with Bank of America”).
26 Bank of America Opinion I, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 508. The court heard oral argument
on August 10, 2009 and received written submissions from the parties on August 24,
2009 and September 9, 2009.
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proposal on fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy grounds. With
respect to the proposal’s fairness, the court observed that “[i]t is
not fair, first and foremost, because it does not comport with the
most elementary notions of justice and morality, in that it proposes
that the shareholders who were the victims of the Bank’s alleged
misconduct now pay the penalty for that misconduct.”27 The Com-
mission made a feeble attempt to defend the corporate penalty as a
worthy signaling device, reasoning that such a mechanism in-
formed shareholders that unsatisfactory corporate conduct had oc-
curred and allowed for a better assessment of management’s
quality and performance.28 Such a desperate argument could not
overcome the court’s distaste for the fact that the BofA share-
holder’s would be paying for their own injury. In the court’s word,
such a construction would be “absurd.”29
With respect to the reasonableness of the proposed settle-
ment, Judge Rakoff could not resist commenting that “a proposal
that asks the victims to pay a fine for their having been victimized is
. . . as unreasonable as it is unfair.”30 The Judge’s opinion went on
to illustrate two additional unreasonable aspects of the proposed
consent judgment.
First, contrary to existing Commission policy, the proposed
settlement failed to adequately address the question of why the
Commission did not “pursue charges against either Bank manage-
ment or the lawyers who allegedly were responsible for the false
and misleading proxy statements.”31 In fact, aside from drawing the
ire of Judge Rakoff, the notion that the BofA victims would bear
the cost of their own victimhood stood in direct contradiction to
the Commission’s own 2006 policy statement concerning the impo-
sition of financial penalties.32 The “Statement of the Securities and
Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties” (the
“Statement”) accompanied the filing of two settled actions with
corporate defendants and was the Commission’s attempt to “pro-
27 Id. at 509.
28 Reply Memorandum of Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission in Sup-
port of Entry of the Proposed Consent Judgment at 13, Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Bank
of America Corp., 677 F. Supp. 2d 717 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09-Civ.-6829 (JSR)), 2009
WL 2876664.
29 Bank of America Opinion I, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 509.
30 Id. at 510.
31 Id. These facts give rise to interesting issues of attorney-client relationships and
privilege, addressed by the court, but beyond the scope of this Article.
32 See Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n., Statement of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), http://www.sec.
gov/news/press/2006-4.htm.
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vide the maximum possible degree of clarity, consistency, and pre-
dictability in explaining the way that its corporate penalty authority
will be exercised.”33 In the Statement, the Commission offered
quite directly that any such activity should “take into account
whether the penalty would be paid by shareholders who had been
the principal victims of the violation.”34 The Statement further in-
structed that “[w]here shareholders have been victimized by the
violative conduct, or by the resulting negative effect on the entity
following its discovery, the Commission is expected to seek penal-
ties from culpable individual offenders acting for a corporation.”35
No such culpable individual offenders were fingered by the Com-
mission in the BofA case. Instead, the instruction seems to have
simply been ignored.
Judge Rakoff’s second illustration of the settlement’s unrea-
sonableness took aim at the consent judgment’s request for injunc-
tive relief, describing the use of injunctive relief as “pointless” in
the circumstance where its imposition lacks a factual predicate.36
BofA’s submissions to the court advanced a position that the proxy
statement in issue “was totally in accordance with the law.”37 Main-
taining such a position effectively hindered any proper imposition
of injunctive relief by the court. As the court noted, “notwithstand-
ing the injunctive relief here sought by the S.E.C., the Bank would
feel free to issue exactly the same kind of proxy statement in the
future.”38 It is well understood that the sanction of contempt “may
only be imposed for violation of a particularized provision known
and reasonably understood by the contemnor.”39
Judge Rakoff’s succinct description of the proposed settle-
ment’s inadequacy revealed his overall disapproval with the Com-
mission’s product:
The proposed Consent Judgment is inadequate. The injunctive
relief, as noted, is pointless. The fine, if looked at from the
33 Id.
34 Id. The Commission also named (i) the need for effective deterrence, (ii) the
presence of fraudulent intent, (iii) possible harm to innocent third parties, and the
possibility of unjust enrichment for the wrongdoer as other factors to be considered.
Id.
35 See id. Accord Securities Law Enforcement: Hearings on H.R. 975 Before the Subcomm.
On Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 101st
Cong., 1 Sess. 47–48 (1989) (statement of David S. Ruder, Chairman, Sec. Exch.
Comm’n., attaching Memorandum in Support of the Securities Law Enforcement
Remedies Act of 1989).
36 Bank of America Opinion I, 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
37 Id. at 511.
38 Id.
39 Id.
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standpoint of the violation, is also inadequate, in that $33 mil-
lion is a trivial penalty for a false statement that materially in-
fected a multi-billion-dollar merger. But since the fine is
imposed, not on the individuals putatively responsible, but on
the shareholders, it is worse than pointless: it further victimizes
the victims.40
Despite conceding that “in certain circumstances,” the court’s
review should include an inquiry into whether the arrangement
“serves the public interest,” Judge Rakoff’s opinion did not address
the proper scope of a “public interest” inquiry any further.41  And,
while not couched explicitly in “public interest” language, the
Judge objected to BofA’s characterization of its decision to pay the
fine as part of the settlement as a proper exercise of its business
judgment. Instead, the Court wondered whether a proper business
decision could be made by parties seemingly not disinterested:
It is one thing for management to exercise its business judgment
to determine how much of its shareholders’ money should be
used to settle a case brought by former shareholders or third
parties. It is quite something else for the very management that
is accused of having lied to its shareholders to determine how
much of those victims’ money should be used to make the case
against the management go away.  And even if this decision is
arguably within their purview, it calls for greater scrutiny by the
Court than would otherwise be the case.42
The court instructed the parties to prepare to litigate the ac-
tion, and set a trial date of February 1, 2010.43
The Commission and BofA returned a few months later, new
settlement in hand. The revised proposal incorporated some mod-
est measures designed to ensure that BofA would not engage in
similar misconduct in the future.44 Toward that end, the revised
40 Id. at 512.
41 See id.
42 Bank of America Opinion I, 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
43 Id. at 512.
44 Bank of America Opinion II, 09 CIV. 6829 (JSR), 2010 WL 624581, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 22, 2010). Specifically, the Bank agreed to (i) engage an independent auditor to
assess accounting controls and procedures and ensure adequate disclosure; (ii) en-
gage a disclosure consul, in consultation with the Commission to report to the audit
committee for three years; (iii) engage a compensation consultant to advise a fully
independent compensation committee of the board; and (iv) submit executive com-
pensation plans to shareholders for a non-binding vote for the next three years. With
respect to penalties, the parties agreed to increase the amount of the fine imposed on
Bank of America from the original $33 million rejected by Judge Rakoff to the new
and improved $150 million. In addition, the $150 million would be distributed, pursu-
ant to Sarbanes-Oxley “Fair Fund” provisions, to Bank of America shareholders who
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settlement comprised two parts: (i) a package of prophylactic mea-
sures tailored to adequately prevent nondisclosures in the future
and (ii) a penalty provision to better “serve the purpose of partially
compensating victims.”45
Judge Rakoff found the changes to be an improvement—how-
ever modest—over the first settlement.46 Begrudgingly, he offered
that “[n]o one can quarrel that these remedial steps are helpful, so
far as they go, and may help to render less likely the kind of piece-
meal and mincing approach to public disclosure that led to the
Bank’s problems in the instant cases.”47 But, as one observer noted,
“the outcome hardly met the judge’s view of an ideal result that
should impose meaningful sanctions or lead Bank of America to
implement real changes in its corporate governance to protect
shareholders in the future.”48 According to the Judge, the new and
improved $150 million fine remained “paltry” in light of the con-
troversy’s size.49 Moreover, the proposed remedies were likely to
have only a “very modest impact on corporate practices or victim
compensation.”50 Finally, in the new construction, the wrongdoers
still escaped unpunished.51 Nonetheless, Judge Rakoff unenthusias-
tically approved the settlement, characterizing it as “better than
nothing” but still “half-baked justice at best.”52
Regardless of the specific outcome in the BofA dispute, Judge
Rakoff’s scathing opinions are noteworthy in two regards. First, de-
spite creating a whole host of inconveniences for the Commission,
the Judge showed great measure and restraint.53 In the end, his
tinkering reflects the reality that the authority to approve a settle-
ment is not the same as the authority to craft one.54 At the same
time, the Judge’s rigor signaled that potential settlements with the
were harmed by the bank’s nondisclosures and not former Merrill shareholders now
holding Bank of America stock as a result of the merger. See id. at *5.
45 Id. at *3.
46 See Peter J. Henning, Should the Perception of Corporate Punishment Matter?, 19 J. L.
& POL’Y 83, 89 (2010).
47 Bank of America Opinion II, 2010 WL 624581, at *4.
48 Henning, supra note 46, at 90.
49 Bank of America Opinion II, 2010 WL 624581, at *4.
50 Id. at *5.
51 Id. at *6.
52 Id. at *5.
53 See id. at *6 (“[T]he considerable power given federal judges to assure compli-
ance with the law should never be confused with any power to impose their own
preferences.”).
54 See Alexandra N. Rothman, Note, Bringing an End to the Trend: Cutting Judicial
“Approval” and “Rejection” Out of Non-Class Mass Settlement, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 332
(2011).
2012] JUDGE RAKOFF’S CRITIQUE OF THE SEC 61
Commission would garner more scrutiny than had previously been
the norm.55
And, it would not be long before another opportunity for re-
view presented itself.
B. SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp.
On December 10, 2010, the SEC filed an enforcement pro-
ceeding against Vitesse Semiconductor Corporation (“Vitesse”)
and four of the company’s officers and directors.56 The complaint
alleged that, for more than a decade, Vitesse “engaged in fraudu-
lent revenue recognition practices and stock options backdatings57
that were concealed from its shareholders and the public by innu-
merable material misstatements in Vitesse’s filings with the
S.E.C.”58 Simultaneous with the complaint, the SEC filed proposed
consent judgments with the company and two of its officers. By all
indications, the Commission anticipated that the court would sim-
ply approve the settlement as negotiated.59
55 See, e.g., David S. Hilzenrath, Judge Jed Rakoff on Free Love, the Death Penalty, Defend-
ing Crooks and Wall Street Justice, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2012, http://www.washington
post.com/business/economy/judge-rakoff-on-free-love-the-death-penalty-defending-
crooks-and-wall-street-justice/2012/01/05/gIQAIGKrDQ_story.html (offering that
“Jed S. Rakoff is driving regulators nuts by refusing to rubber-stamp the kind of deals
that have long defined Securities and Exchange Commission justice”).
56 Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 305–6
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
57 Id. at 305. “Options backdating” describes generally the practice of strategically
dating the issuance of stock options contracts awarded to corporate executives to cor-
respond to a low stock price. The options backdating practice has been used by corpo-
rations to (i) enhance the value of options grants for employees and (ii) retain the tax
benefits of having issued “at the money” contracts. While not per se illegal, the SEC
has increasingly espoused the position that backdating might be considered fraudu-
lent. For a thoughtful description of options backdating practices, incentives that
drove corporations to the practice, and the Commission’s thoughts on enforcement,
see Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director, Div. of Enforcement, Sec. Exch. Comm’n.,
Options Backdating: The Enforcement Perspective (Oct. 30, 2006), http://www.sec.
gov/news/speech/2006/spch103006lct.htm (“Too many companies seem to have
succumbed to the temptation to make in the money grants that appeared—for all
corporate intents and purposes—to be at the money grants.”). In the Vitesse case, the
Commission alleged that the backdating occurred between 1995 and 2006 and in-
cluded the re-pricing of forty stock option grants without proper accounting, result-
ing in the company’s failure to record appropriately $184 million in compensation
expenses. See Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 306.
58 Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. at 305. The complaint alleges that the
fraudulent practices were orchestrated by the four individual defendants: CEO Louis
Tomasetta, CFO Eugene Hovanec, Controller Yatin Mody, and Director of Finance
Nicole Kaplan. Id. at 306.
59 Id. at 306 (describing the SEC as “confident that the courts in this judicial dis-
trict were no more than rubber stamps”); see also Maurice Pesso, Guest Post: Judge
Rakoff Again Criticizes SEC Settlements, How Will D&O Insurers Respond?, WHITE AND WIL-
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Again, Judge Rakoff charged that the consent judgments
lacked information explaining why they should be approved and
how they met the requisite legal standards for court approval.60 In
response to the Judge’s request for additional clarity, the Commis-
sion submitted a December 21, 2010 brief and participated in a
hearing the following day.
In its submission to the court, the Commission offered the
standard that the court should apply to its approval determination,
writing that it is “well established” that court approval of a pro-
posed consent judgment required a determination that the agree-
ment serve “the public interest.”61 The Commission further
provided that, in making such a determination, the court “need
not inquire into the precise legal rights of the parties nor reach
and resolve the merits of the claims or controversy, but need only
determine that the settlement is fair, adequate, reasonable and ap-
propriate under the particular facts” and that there has been a
valid consent by the parties.62 Quoting Judge Rakoff’s opinion
from the earlier Bank of America decision, the Commission asserted
that the court “has the obligation, within carefully prescribed lim-
its, to determine whether the proposed Consent Judgment settling
[a] case is fair, reasonable, adequate and in the public interest.”63
Finally, the SEC suggested that the scope of the court’s inquiry is
not unlimited, and must show “substantial deference to the SEC as
the regulatory body having primary responsibility for policing the
securities markets.”64
The court offered its opinion on March 21, 2011.65 While
Judge Rakoff once again needled the Commission with his sharp
critique, the Vitesse opinion is ultimately remarkable for its re-
straint. The Judge acknowledged that, at first glance, the terms of
the proposed consent judgments might appear inadequate based
LIAMS LLP (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.whiteandwilliams.com/resources-alerts-345.
html.
60 Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d at 306 (commenting that the Com-
mission filed the proposed Consent Judgments “without so much as a word of expla-
nation as to why the Court should approve these Consent Judgments or how the
Consent Judgments met the legal standards the Court is required to apply before
granting such approval”).
61 SEC Brief, supra note 12, at 32 (citing SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529–30
(9th Cir. 1984)).
62 Id. at 35 (quoting Metro. House. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 616
F.2d 1006, 1014 (7th Cir. 1980)).
63 Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d at 304, 306–7 (referencing SEC Letter
Brief dated Dec. 21, 2010).
64 Id. at 307 (referencing SEC Letter Brief dated Dec. 21, 2010).
65 Id. at 304.
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on the relatively small size of the monetary penalties and the fact
that the allegations of material misconduct by the defendants
lasted over a decade.66 Yet, despite the fact that the three defend-
ants neither admitted nor denied liability, Judge Rakoff found the
terms of the settlement to be “fair, reasonable, adequate, and in
the public interest.”67
The carefully crafted decision reveals a balance of purposeful
deliberation and practical concern. In arriving at his conclusion,
Judge Rakoff considered several factors beyond the terms of the
actual settlement. First, the fact that the two corporate officers had
pled guilty to parallel criminal charges and were cooperating with
the government in its criminal case against two other Vitesse of-
ficers was compelling.68 In real terms, the guilty pleas meant that
the “public is not left to speculate about the truth of the essential
charges” alleged in the Commission’s complaint.69 With respect to
the company, the Judge was impressed that Vitesse had let “its
money do the talking” by contributing substantial funds to a class
action settlement pool despite its troubled financial condition.70 In
the Judge’s estimation, “[n]o reasonable observer of these events
could doubt that the company has effectively admitted the allega-
tions of the complaint.”71
Despite approving the settlement, Judge Rakoff again regis-
tered his displeasure with the Commission’s longstanding practice
of seeking court approval for settlements in which serious allega-
tions of fraud are asserted against defendants without requiring an
express admission or denial.72 While the effects of such a policy
were somewhat minimized in the Vitesse matter where two of the
defendants had already pled guilty to related criminal charges,
nonetheless, the Judge again took the opportunity to question
whether a practice of non-admission/non-denial might ultimately
render a proposed consent judgment “so unreasonable or contrary
to the public interest as to warrant its disapproval.”73
At the time of the Vitesse disposition, however, neither the
Judge nor the Commission could have anticipated that yet another
66 Id. at 307.
67 Id. at 308.
68 Id. at 307 (“These terms are very much colored by the fact that Mody and
Kaplan have pleaded guilty to parallel criminal charges and are now cooperating with
the Government.”).
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showdown over that very issue would again embroil the two a little
more than half a year later.
C. SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.
In a third strongly worded opinion, on November 28, 2011,
Judge Rakoff emphatically rejected a proposed $285 million settle-
ment of an enforcement action that the SEC had brought against
Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.74
On October 19, 2011, the SEC had filed a civil enforcement
action accusing Citigroup of a substantial securities fraud.75 In fa-
miliar style, the Commission simultaneously filed a proposed con-
sent judgment.76 Pursuant to the terms of the consent judgment,
Citigroup would pay a total of $285 million, consisting of a dis-
gorgement of profits of $160 million, $30 million in interest, and a
civil penalty of $95 million.77 Specifically, the Commission charged
Citigroup with violations of Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Secur-
ities Act of 1933 for misleading investors about the quality of secur-
ities underlying a $1 billion synthetic collateralized debt
obligation.78 The complaint related to a fund known as “Class V
Funding III” and alleged that Citigroup employed the fund “to
dump some dubious assets on misinformed investors.”79 While
Class V Funding III was marketed as consisting of attractive assets,
the Commission asserted that the fund was, in fact, arranged to
include a “substantial percentage of negatively projected assets”
and that Citigroup had taken a substantial short position in the
same assets.80 Citigroup realized profits of $160 million, while in-
vestors lost more than $700 million.81
Largely because Citigroup had agreed to the proposed settle-
ment and consent judgment absent an admission or denial of the
allegations, Judge Rakoff had, in an order dated October 27, 2011,
“put some questions to the parties” concerning the proposed
settlement.82
Among the questions posed by the court were the following:
74 Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328,
334–35 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
75 See Complaint, Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 827 F.
Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 Civ. 7387), 2011 WL 4965843.
76 See Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 330.
77 Id.
78 See Complaint, supra note 75.
79 Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 329.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 330.
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Given the S.E.C.’s statutory mandate to ensure transparency in
the financial marketplace, is there an overriding public interest
in determining whether the S.E.C.’s charges are true? Is the in-
terest even stronger when there is no parallel criminal case?83
The court’s inquiries were aimed at defining the proper scope
of the “public interest” prong of its review. And, the question calls
attention to at least two problems with a proposed settlement that
disposes of the controversy without an appropriate level of detail as
to the underlying conduct. First, by approving a final judgment
without making available the evidence developed in the course of
the Commission’s investigation, interested parties are left to “draw
their own conclusions about the evidence underlying the allega-
tions in the SEC Complaint.”84  As the Judge’s question hints, such
a result might seem particularly displeasing given the Commis-
sion’s responsibilities. Moreover, the Commission’s decision to
charge Citigroup with only a negligence-based offense could lend
credence to a subsequent Citigroup assertion, in related proceed-
ings, that the judgment resulted from a lack of scienter.85 Such a
result would seem to frustrate the Commission’s own policy of bar-
ring subsequent public denials on the part of defendants.86
On November 28, 2011, the court issued its opinion in the
matter. Despite “the substantial deference due the S.E.C. in mat-
ters of this kind,” the court refused to approve the consent judg-
ment.87 After an in-depth discussion concerning the appropriate
scope of review,88 Judge Rakoff emphatically rejected the Commis-
83 Sec. Exch. Comm’n.’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Questions Posed by
the Court Regarding Proposed Settlement at 15, Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Citigroup
Global Markets Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) supplemented (Dec. 29,
2011) (No. 11-07387), 2011 WL 5307417.
84 Brief of Union Central Life Ins. Co. et al. as Amici Curiae Responding to the
Court’s October 27, 2011 Order at 6, Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Citigroup Global Markets
Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11-CV-07387), available at http://new-
sandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/uploadedFiles/Reuters_Content/2011/11_-_No-
vember/SECvCiti—proposedamicus.pdf. The brief also commented that “despite the
fact that any proposed settlement must serve ‘the public interest,’ the SEC is advocat-
ing for a proposed Final Judgment that does not directly address the harm reaped
upon investors by CGMI’s alleged sale of over $1 billion in RMBS that it allegedly
designed to fail.” Id. at 7.
85 Id. at 8–9.
86 See 17 C.F.R. § 10 app.A (providing that the defendant agree not to “take any
action or make any public statement, denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in
the complaint or finding or conclusions in the order, or creating, or tending to cre-
ate, the impression that the complaint or the order is without a factual basis”).
87 Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 330.
88 See generally discussion of “The Likely Effects of the Newfound Attention,” part
IV, infra.
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sion’s contention that the public interest was not an appropriate
consideration in assessing the proposed settlement, and “regret-
fully” concluded that “the proposed Consent Judgment is neither
fair, nor reasonable, nor adequate, nor in the public interest.”89
The Judge’s toughest objection concerned the casual nature by
which the Commission requested the application of judicial power.
In short, the Judge simply could not abide that the Commission
asked the court to “employ its power and assert its authority when
it does not know the facts.”90
Turning to the economic effects of the proposed settlement,
the Judge first noted that the settlement amount was “pocket
change” to an entity as large as Citigroup.91 Moreover, in his view,
the arrangement would leave the defrauded investors “substantially
short-changed,” dealing “a double blow to any assistance the de-
frauded investors might seek to derive from the S.E.C. litigation in
attempting to recoup their losses through private litigation” since
the non-admission/non-denial nature of the arrangement amelio-
rates any collateral estoppel assistance.92 The court was also “troub-
led” when it compared the $95 million penalty sought with the
$535 million penalty imposed in the consent judgment entered
into a year earlier between the SEC and Goldman Sachs “involving
remarkably similar alleged conduct in the same time period.”93
The opinion concluded by consolidating the case with a paral-
lel action against the Citigroup official responsible for the Class V
Funding III fund and scheduling a trial for July 16, 2012.94 The
89 Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332.
90 Id. at 335 (noting that “[a]n application of judicial power that does not rest on
the facts is worse than mindless, it is inherently dangerous”).
91 Id. at 333–34. For the court, this was particularly distasteful in light of the fact
that Citigroup was a “recidivist.” In fact, the SEC has accused Citigroup of fraud five
times since 2003, settling in each case. See Tim Fernholz, Why the SEC Will Soon Be
Prosecuting More Cases Against Big Banks—And Losing, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 1, 2011,
http://www.tnr.com/article/97963/SEC-banks-settlement#. Repeat offenders seem
to be not all that rare. A recent New York Times analysis of SEC enforcement actions
over the last fifteen years, for example, found “at least 51 cases in which 19 Wall Street
firms had broken antifraud laws they had agreed never to breach.” See Edward Wyatt,
Promises Made, and Remade, by Firms in S.E.C. Fraud Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/business/in-sec-fraud-cases-banks-make-and-
break-promises.html?pagewanted=all. These results might not be all that surprising in
light of Professor Baynard’s assertion that “the civil sanctions available to the SEC—
inconveniences, really—are unlikely to deter committed recidivists.” See Jayne W. Bar-
nard, Securities Fraud, Recidivism, and Deterrence, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 189, 221 (2008).
92 Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 334.
93 See SEC Brief, supra note 12, at 19.
94 See Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335; Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v.
Stoker, 873 F. Supp. 2d 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). On July 31, 2012, a federal trial jury
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Commission found itself scrambling to craft a response.95
On March 15, 2012, a panel of three Second Circuit judges
stayed the Citigroup proceedings pending resolution of Citigroup’s
appeal of Judge Rakoff’s rejection of the proposed settlement.96 In
granting the stay, the panel was persuaded that Citigroup
presented a “strong showing of likelihood of success” in having the
Judge’s rejection set aside.97 The full appeal has moved to a sepa-
rate Second Circuit panel that remains “free to resolve all issues
without preclusive effect”98 after having heard the arguments in
February 2013.
II. THE COMMISSION’S CONSENT JUDGMENT PRACTICE AND THE
AFFINITY FOR SETTLEMENT
In civil litigation, it is well established that a dispute can be
resolved by contract between the parties, and courts remain “nearly
powerless to shape their private bargain.”99 In fact, “[p]urely pri-
vate parties can settle a case without ever agreeing on the facts, for
all that is required is that a plaintiff dismiss his complaint.”100 This
policy choice embraces the fact that private resolution is highly de-
sirable, resulting in savings for the parties in terms of the time and
money typically expended in protracted litigation.101 In fact, settle-
found that the SEC had failed to prove Mr. Stoker liable for the alleged securities
fraud. See Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Stoker, No. 11 –cv-7388 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. July 31,
2012).
95 Jean Eaglesham & Suzanne Kapner, SEC Cops Want to Fight U.S. Judge, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 16, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702048445045770
98833058976236.html (observing that the “settlement’s rejection is proving to be a
nightmare for the SEC” and commenting SEC staff is likely to suggest that the com-
mission appeal the Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. decision). For a more thorough
description of the procedural history of the Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. matter, see
SEC Brief, supra note 12, at 7–10.
96 Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d Cir.
2012).
97 Id. at 169.
98 Id. at 161.
99 Henderson, supra note 3 at 4; see also Hester Indus., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
160 F.3d 911, 916 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a settlement and dismissal was accom-
plished by “mutual agreement of the parties, and did not require any judicial ac-
tion”); Bank of America Opinion I, 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Society
greatly benefits when lawsuits are amicably resolved, and, for that reason, an ordinary
civil settlement that includes dismissal of the underlying action is close to
unreviewable.”).
100 Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332. A plaintiff need only file a
notice of dismissal with the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). If the case has
moved beyond the preliminary stage, a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties
must be filed. Id.(a)(1)(A)(ii).
101 Danné L. Johnson, SEC Settlement: Agency Self-Interest or Public Interest, 12 FORDHAM
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ments routinely bring relief to injured parties more expeditiously
than “a long wait for a judicial finding of wrongdoing.”102 A strong
and established public policy in favor of settlement also reduces
the number of trials, and is consistent with the civil justice system’s
primary objective to ensure “the just, speedy, and inexpensive de-
termination of every action.”103 Moreover, leaving it to the parties
to resolve their own dispute is generally supported on economic
efficiency grounds.104
Today, the vast majority of Commission proceedings (over
90%) are settled—not litigated on the merits.105 And, the Commis-
sion, by its own admission, has a “longstanding policy of settling
cases on the basis of neither requiring an admission nor permitting
a denial by the defendant.”106 At least one court has signaled that a
federal policy in favor of settlements “has particular force where
. . . a government actor committed to the protection of the public
interest has pulled the laboring oar in constructing the proposed
settlement.”107 And, the overwhelming majority of courts have
agreed—approving SEC settlements rather routinely, and “without
scrutinizing their factual bases or requiring substantive
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 627, 651 (2007) (noting that “[i]n most civil cases, equal parties
enter into good faith negotiation motivated to arrive at a compromise agreement,
thus avoiding the time, cost, emotional toll, and risk of trial”); see also Henderson,
supra note 3, at 4.
102 Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1177, 1196–97 (2009).
103 See Johnson, supra note 101, at 651 (quoting Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,
28 U.S.C. § 471 (1995)).
104 See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, J. L. & ECON. Oct. 1960
(positing that, in a world without transaction costs, efficient outcomes could be best
achieved by individual negotiation, and further providing that government is best to
simply determine how rights would be assigned in a negotiation between firms and
individuals absent such frictions). But cf. Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement,
93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (asserting that private settlement comes at a public price
since the point of adjudication is not merely to resolve private disputes, but to bring
reality closer to our ideals through the decision making of public officials).
105 See David M. Weiss, Reexamining the SEC’s Use of Obey-The-Law Injunctions, 7 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 6 (2006); Johnson, supra note 101, at 647 (“The SEC settles most en-
forcement actions by consent.”); Parloff, supra note 13 (observing that “about 90% of
SEC cases are currently concluded by consent decree, and the lynchpin for virtually
every one of those is that the defendant doesn’t admit wrongdoing”); see also
Eaglesham & Kapner, supra note 95 (“In the past year, the SEC went to trial in 19
cases, while filing a record-high 735 enforcement actions.”).
106 Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 308
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (referencing SEC Letter Brief of Dec. 21, 2010).
107 United States v. Cannons Eng’g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 1990); see also
Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1991) (observing a “strong
federal policy favoring the approval and enforcement of consent decrees”).
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modifications.”108
Some have warned, however, that the public’s affinity for pri-
vate settlement should not be embraced reflexively in the context
of the settlements of a public agency.109 Indeed, closer scrutiny
seems a wise policy, as public agency settlements routinely lack at
least three hallmarks of the best private settlements.110 Notably,
public agency settlements, in general, and Commission settle-
ments, in particular, can be distinguished from the best private set-
tlements because they (i) regularly impact third parties, (ii) often
lack good faith negotiations between two equal parties, and (iii)
generally derive from less noble motivations.111
Significant judicial scrutiny of settlements is not uncommon.
In fact, several types of settlements expressly require judicial ap-
proval. Class actions,112 shareholder derivative settlements,113 bank-
ruptcy proceedings,114 and cases involving minors or
incompetents115 all require judicial approval. In addition, criminal
plea agreements116 require judicial consent. While the specific ra-
tionale for requiring a judicial approval or consent varies accord-
ing to context, in each case, the court is employed in an effort to
protect claimants and ensure a “fair shake” for all involved.117
A. The History of SEC Settlements
In a footnote to its letter brief to the court in the Vitesse matter,
the Commission suggested that its practice of settling enforcement
actions in which defendants neither admit nor deny the allegations
108 See Scott B. Schreiber et al., SEC Announces New Policy Regarding “Neither Admit
Nor Deny” Language in Settlements, ADVISORY (Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, D.C.),
Jan. 2012, at 2, available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Ad
visory%20SEC_Announces_New_Policy_Regarding_Neither_Admit_Nor_Deny_Lang
uage_Settlements.pdf.
109 See Johnson, supra note 101, at 652 (suggesting that “[t]he framework used to
examine public policy interests in governmental settlements should be distinct and
separate from the framework used to examine private settlements”).
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Federal Rule 23(e) provides that “the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified
class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s ap-
proval.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
113 Id. 23.1(c).
114 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a).
115 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1207 (MCKINNEY 2011).
116 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c).
117 See Rothman, supra note 54, at 331, 352; see also SEC Brief, supra note 12, at 25
(arguing that “[t]he law is clear that a federal judge has a responsibility to indepen-
dently determine whether a proposed consent judgment satisfies well-established stan-
dards of being fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the public interest”).
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of a complaint dates back to at least 1972, when the Commission
provided its express approval for the policy in a release entitled
“Consent Decrees in Judicial or Administrative Proceedings.”118 In
essence, “neither admit nor deny” represents a crude construction
resulting from a desire to adopt a policy satisfying both the Com-
mission’s “insistence that its allegations not be disavowed and also
defendants’ desire to argue in subsequent litigation that they are
not bound by admissions.”119
In a history lesson, no doubt embarrassing for the Commis-
sion, Judge Rakoff describes a more robust version of a practice “a
bit more complicated than the S.E.C.’s footnote suggests.”120 It
seems that the Commission’s “non-admission/non-denial” practice
started long before 1972 and by the time of the Commission’s re-
lease, had grown to be strongly desired by defendants eager to
deny wrongdoing and strategically employ the collateral estoppel
advantages of a Commission settlement in parallel private civil ac-
tions.121 By 1972, as Judge Rakoff describes,
[I]t had become obvious that as soon as courts had signed off on
such settlements, the defendants would start public campaigns
denying that they had ever done what the S.E.C. had accused
them of doing and claiming, instead, that they had simply en-
tered into the settlements to avoid protracted litigation with a
powerful administrative agency.122
Against this backdrop, the Commission’s 1972 Release can be
seen as little more than a minor improvement or refinement,
aimed at keeping the settling defendant from subsequently deny-
ing in public the complaint’s original allegations.123 Today’s pro-
posed settlements support this interpretation, routinely including
118 Consent Decrees in Judicial or Administrative Proceedings, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 352, Exchange Act Release No. 5337, 1972 WL 125351 (Nov. 28, 1972)
(codified as amended 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(e)).
119 William O. Reckler & Blake T. Denton, Understanding Recent Changes to the SEC’s
“Neither Admit Nor Deny” Settlement Policy, Client Alert (Latham & Watkins, New York,
N.Y.), Jan. 12, 2012, at 2; see also Fernholz, supra note 91 (“[S]uch settlements are
flawed as instruments of justice.”); Parloff, supra note 13 (“[S]ince 1972, the SEC has
required corporations in the consent decree to promise not to deny the allegations of
the complaint in public.”).




123 See Consent Decrees in Judicial or Administrative Proceedings, supra note 118.
Today, defendants routinely agree not to “take any action or make any public state-
ment, denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in the complaint or findings or
conclusions in the order, or creating, or tending to create, the impression that the
complaint or the order is without a factual basis.” 17 C.F.R. § 10 app.A.
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boilerplate language prohibiting the settling party from engaging
in similar securities law violations in the future, and from making
or sponsoring any public statement denying any allegations in the
government’s complaint.124
Despite the minor improvement that a “non-admission/non-
denial” regime might represent over a system in which a public
denial was often pronounced before the ink on the settlement was
dry, it remains difficult to uncover the proper respect being af-
forded the truth in today’s practice of routinely embracing a “non-
admission/non-denial” posture in settlement.125 In fact, fostering
such a policy typically disfavors the truthful facts of a particular
situation, instead resorting to a comfortable contrivance that each
party can live with. Such a posture seems hostile to both the Com-
mission’s charge to protect the integrity of the nation’s securities
markets and the duty of courts to defend and ensure the public
interest.126  The irony of truth taking a back seat to convenience in
the federal securities realm cannot be overstated. In particular,
such a convenience is at least unbecoming within an overarching
regulatory structure that regularly calls upon registrants to abide by
full, fair, and accurate disclosure of the kind that a prudent inves-
tor would like to know before making an investment decision. Cer-
tainly, the truth must also play an integral role in a court’s
fulfilllment of its public interest duties.
While not required, the court’s approval has increasingly be-
come a convenient imprimatur to each Commission settlement.
Since 1972, and largely unchallenged, the Commission has regu-
larly employed the courts as its enforcement partner—expected to
124 See Richard J. Morvillo et al., To Neither Admit Nor Deny: SEC Litigation Position
Reiterates Need to Examine Standard Provisions in SEC Settlements (Crowell & Moring LLP,
Washington, D.C.), April 2001, at 1, available at http://www.crowell.com/pdf/Con
sents.pdf.
125 See, e.g., Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d at 309 (bemoaning the result-
ing “stew of confusion and hypocrisy unworthy of such a proud agency as the S.E.C.”).
126 Perhaps even more troubling is the practice discussed by SEC Commissioner
Luis Aguilar in a recent speech (and highlighted by Judge Rakoff in Vitesse):
I hope that 2011 brings an end to the press release issued by a defen-
dant after a settlement explaining how the conduct was really not that
bad or that the regulator over-reacted. I hope that this revisionist history
in press releases will be a relic of the past. If not, it may be worth revisit-
ing the Commission’s practice of routinely accepting settlements from
defendants who agree to sanctions ‘without admitting or denying’ the
misconduct.
See Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, Sec. Exch. Comm’n., Speech by SEC Commis-
sioner: Setting Forth Aspirations for 2011, Address to Practicing Law Institute’s SEC
Speaks in 2011 Program (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/
spch020411laa.htm.
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stand by, ready to impose contempt charges or injunctive relief in
the event that the settling party subsequently violates the agree-
ment’s terms.127
B. The Insatiable Desire to Involve the Courts
In each of the cases that are the subject of this Article, the
Commission sought more than simple settlement and dismissal. In-
stead, the Commission opted to seek a consent decree—a judg-
ment or order reflecting the settlement terms agreed to by the
parties, and containing an injunction.128 Unlike simple dismissal,
settlement through consent decree or consent judgment requires
judicial approval,129 as a judge “must be confident that the settle-
ment achieved through the consent decree or consent judgment is
in the public interest.”130
C. Comparing Simple Settlement with Consent Judgments
The distinctions between simple dismissal and consent judg-
ment are significant. While both represent an arrangement be-
tween the Commission and the alleged wrongdoer, the consent
decree emboldens the Commission—retaining the court as its
ongoing enforcement partner.131 In fact, in a recent article, Profes-
sor DiSarro highlighted several key distinctions between consent
decrees and settlement agreements.132 Among these, the mode of
enforcement remains the most significant.133 In effect, the pres-
127 Cf. Reckler & Denton, supra note 119, at 2 (observing that “[w]hile the SEC can
settle administrative actions brought internally without review by an administrative
law judge, it must obtain a federal judge’s approval to settle an action brought in
district court”).
128 See In re Masters Mates & Pilots Pension Plan & IRAP Litig., 957 F.2d 1020, 1025
(2d Cir. 1992) (describing a consent decree as “no more than a settlement that con-
tains an injunction”); Gates v. Shinn, 98 F.3d 463, 468 (9th Cir. 1996) (“When a de-
cree commands or prohibits conduct, it is called an injunction.”); see also Rothman,
supra note 54, at 332 (describing a consent judgment as a “court decree that all par-
ties agree to”).
129 See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 n.7 (2001) (“Private settlements do not entail the judicial
approval and oversight involved in consent decrees.”).
130 Rothman, supra note 54, at 332; see also United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 430
F. Supp. 83, 85–86 (D. Alaska 1977).
131 See generally Anthony DiSarro, Six Decrees of Separation: Settlement Agreements and
Consent Orders in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 276–79 (2010).
132 Id. at 276.
133 Id. at 277. The DiSarro article also points to five other differences, most beyond
the scope or concern of this Article. The other differences include: (i) the consent
decree is a public document subject to public access and inspection; (ii) the court
ordering the consent decree has inherent enforcement powers; (iii) the injunctive
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ence of an injunction in the consent decree makes non-compli-
ance with the settlement terms contempt of court.134 By contrast,
failure to abide by a simple settlement agreement would represent
breach of contract.135 This difference goes a long way to explaining
the Commission’s embrace of a policy that routinely involves the
courts in its settlements with defendants.
A second difference between the consent decree and the sim-
ple settlement concerns the ability of the parties to keep the terms
of their agreement beyond the eyes of others. The consent decree
is a public document subject to inspection.136 By comparison, a set-
tlement agreement remains the private document of the parties to
the controversy, and its terms are routinely kept confidential.137
A third difference between the consent decree and the simple
settlement concerns the subsequent enforcement of the agree-
ment’s provisions. Because a consent decree is a court order, the
issuing federal court retains the inherent power to enforce its
terms. The enforcement of settlement agreements, by contrast, is
generally the province of the state courts and the parties enjoy no
routine access to the federal courts absent party diversity and a fed-
eral court filing.138 When private parties ask a court to retain juris-
diction to enforce a settlement, however, the court has absolute
discretion whether or not to do so.139
The particularity of a settlement may also change when it is
embodied in a consent decree. While the injunctive provisions of a
consent decree “must be stated in reasonable detail and cannot
incorporate other documents by reference,” settlement agree-
ments are “not held to any requisite level of particularity.”140
Finally, as a court document, the consent decree remains sub-
provisions of the consent decree “must be stated in reasonable detail and cannot in-
corporate other documents by reference”; (iv) a court can insist on subsequent
changes to a court issued consent decree; and (v) consent decrees can form the basis
for the award of attorney’s fees where a federal statute permits such an award. Id. at
276–79.
134 Id. at 277. See Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478
U.S. 501, 518 (1986) (“Noncompliance with a consent decree is enforceable by cita-
tion for contempt of court.”).
135 DiSarro, supra note 131, at 277.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 278 (adding that “[s]ome courts have concluded that parties stipulating to
the jurisdiction of a federal court to resolve settlement disputes is the functional
equivalent of a consent decree. This reasoning is flawed.”).
139 See generally Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381–82
(1994).
140 DiSarro, supra note 131, at 278.
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ject to change at the wishes of the issuing court, and “consent de-
crees can subsequently be modified or terminated by the court,
even over the objections of one of the parties.”141 Any change to a
settlement agreement, on the other hand, can only be accom-
plished through mutual consent of the parties.142
Proposed settlements with the Commission are routinely ac-
companied by boilerplate language regularly included in settle-
ment documents for both administrative proceedings and
injunctive actions.143 The language typically provides that the set-
tling party refrain from (i) similar securities law violations in the
future and (ii) making or permitting any public statement denying
any allegations in the government’s underlying complaint.144 To-
day, the Commission routinely opts for the consent judgment in-
stead of simple settlement. Presumably, by employing the consent
judgment, the Commission reduces its enforcement costs. In fact,
with respect to the Commission’s consent judgment practice, the
Commission has displayed an insatiable appetite for involving the
court in its ongoing enforcement efforts. In the event of non-com-
pliance, the consent judgment ensures that the government need
not file a lawsuit to effect enforcement.145 The Commission expects
the court to stand by, ready to (i) accept a petition to set aside the
agreement, (ii) provide injunctive relief, or (iii) enforce a con-
tempt charge, as each might be required following a settler’s
breach. Moreover, while the Commission has routinely sought judi-
cial authority in reaching a settlement, it has very rarely called
upon a court to employ its enforcement powers.
D. Subsequent Enforcement Efforts: Injunction and Contempt
While the Commission has increasingly sought the judiciary’s
imprimatur in its settlement efforts, it has very rarely called upon a
court to enforce an injunction or issue a contempt order following
the non-compliance of one of its settlements. The Commission has
shown some willingness to respond to subsequent defendant deni-
als by threatening to invoke a settlement’s contractual right to peti-
tion the court to vacate a consent judgment.146 And, the
Commission has actually moved to vacate consent judgments based
upon the defendant’s denial of culpability. In at least one case, for
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Morvillo et al., supra note 124, at 1.
144 For a discussion of the typical SEC boilerplate see id.
145 Henderson, supra note 3, at 4.
146 Morvillo et al., supra note 124, at 1–2.
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example, the Commission withdrew its motion only after the defen-
dant withdrew his denial.147
There is ample evidence that the injunctive remedy has been
seen as a “cornerstone” of the Commission’s enforcement toolkit
since its founding.148 As one commentator describes: “[l]ike other
special types of government settlements . . . a consent decree is a
judicial Sword of Damocles intended to increase performance of
the defendant under the terms of the settlement.”149 As the Com-
mission is fast recognizing, however, this “sword”—like most—is
double-edged. As the three cases examined in this Article high-
light, the Commission’s choice to employ the court as its enforce-
ment partner reduces the Commission’s own monitoring and
enforcement costs. Such an advantage brings costs all its own, how-
ever. Most notably, such a strategy means that the court might ask
questions that cause a certain amount of discomfort for the Com-
mission.150 In light of Judge Rakoff’s recent predilection (and the
copycats that are likely to follow) and the infrequency with which
the Commission has actually called upon a court to enjoin a set-
tling party from subsequent violations, it is high time for the Com-
mission to reconsider whether seeking court approved consent
judgments as a matter of course continues to represent a wise
policy.
Injunctions allow the Commission to sanction repeat offend-
ers with contempt of court.151 The civil contempt remedy remains
available to the Commission in the event that either (i) a defen-
dant is engaging in an ongoing violation of an injunction or (ii)
compensation is due the Commission as a result of a defendant’s
violation of an injunction.152 Criminal contempt charges may also
be brought against defendants who disobey previous injunctions.153
147 Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Angelos, C.A. No. B96-834 (D. Md., Mar. 20, 1996), Lit.
Rel. No. 14886 (Apr. 22, 1996), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr14886.txt.
148 Russell Ryan, Rethinking SEC Injunctions After Appeals Court Reprimand, 37 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1488 (Sept. 5, 2005) (noting that injunctions have
“been the cornerstone of the SEC’s enforcement program for more than 70 years”);
see also Weiss, supra note 105, at 6 (commenting that “[s]ince the founding of the
Commission more than seventy years ago, the injunction has served as the SEC’s most
reliable enforcement tool”).
149 Henderson, supra note 3, at 4; see also Morvillo et al., supra note 124, at 1 (com-
menting that “[t]his provision stems from the Commission’s desire to use its police
(and public relations) powers to promote deterrence”).
150 See sources cited supra note 149.
151 Weiss, supra note 105.
152 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. N.Y. Broadway Int’l Corp., 705 F.2d 94, 96 (2d
Cir. 1983).
153 Weiss, supra note 105.
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There is no disputing that it is among the “most formidable weap-
ons” in the court’s arsenal, and “one with significant potential for
harm if it is wielded imprudently.”154 It follows, therefore, that
courts should make that remedy available to an administrative
agency deliberately, and only after a satisfactory showing that the
underlying facts are serious enough to warrant its necessity.155 In
the words of Judge Rakoff:
[W]hen a public agency asks a court to become its partner in
enforcement by imposing wide-ranging injunctive remedies on a
defendant, enforced by the formidable judicial power of con-
tempt, the court, and the public, need some knowledge of what
the underlying facts are: for otherwise, the court becomes a
mere handmaiden to a settlement privately negotiated on the
basis of unknown facts, while the public is deprived of ever
knowing the truth in a matter of obvious public importance.156
Despite the formidable nature of the contempt remedy, by its
own admission, the Commission “has not frequently pursued civil
contempt proceedings and does not appear to have initiated such
proceedings against a ‘large financial entity’ in the last ten
years.”157 Before asking a court to play a significant role in the
ongoing monitoring of the defendant’s behavior, the Commission
must explain to the court exactly what it has bargained for. Aside
from satisfying the requirement of independent judicial power,
such a requirement is made all the more necessary by the cynical
nature of the routine settlement bargain described below.
E. The Cynical Nature of the Consent Judgment Bargain
It remains difficult to refute that, as a practical matter, the
practice of routine settlement, absent an express admission or de-
nial, offers a convenience for the Commission and defendants
alike.158 From a subject’s perspective, settlement invariably offers a
desirable alternative to the expensive and unwanted publicity of a
trial.159 In addition, settling defendants will often seek concessions
154 United States v. Local 1804-1, Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO, 44 F.3d
1091, 1095–96 (2d Cir. 1995).
155 See e.g., Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d
328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that the injunctive power “is not a free-roving rem-
edy to be invoked at the whim of a regulatory agency, even with the consent of the
regulated”).
156 Id. at 332.
157 SEC’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 83, at 23.
158 Pesso, supra note 59, at 1.
159 See Weiss, supra note 105 (citing to James D. Cox et al., SECURITIES REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 773 (4th ed. 2004)).
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concerning the violations alleged in the Commission’s complaint
and may negotiate with the Commission with respect to the lan-
guage of the complaint and the collateral and administrative con-
sequences of the consent judgment.160 By contrast, a loss at trial
may result “not only in immediate sanctions but also in the defen-
dant being collaterally estopped from relitigating related issues in
subsequent private actions.”161 In addition, a cooperative and so-
phisticated defendant might be able to negotiate with the Commis-
sion about the shape and frequency of publicity surrounding a
settlement.162 For the Commission, its staff is simply too small to try
more than the smallest fraction of the cases it investigates.163 By
allowing defendants to settle without admitting liability, the Com-
mission benefits from a willingness of defendants to enter into set-
tlements at an earlier time—all without requiring the Commission
to devote substantial resources to taking enforcement actions to
trial.164 Accordingly, settlements offer the Commission a conve-
nient combination of discernable victory without the correspond-
ing expense in time and treasure.165
160 See Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Clifton 700 F.2d 744, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
161 Weiss, supra note 105; see also Pesso, supra note 59 (“By entering into the consent
judgments without admitting liability, the defendants are not collaterally estopped
from asserting their innocence in parallel civil actions.”).
162 Dreilinger, supra note 16, at 13 (offering that “[a] defendant may therefore be
able to shape the public’s perception of the SEC’s allegations by negotiating for the
inclusion of mitigating factors, eliminating some or all of a corporate defendant’s
employees from the charges, or softening the typically harsh language in the litigation
releases”).
163 See, e.g., Macey, supra note 25, at 646 (“Because investigations take time, the SEC
focuses on bringing cases that do not require much, if any, investigative effort.”). In
fiscal year 2011, the SEC filed 735 enforcement actions, representing an 8.6% in-
crease over 2010; see SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., FY 2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY REPORT, 2 (2011), http://sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2011.pdf.
164 Pesso, supra note 59; see also Robert Khuzami, Former Director, Div. of Enforce-
ment, Sec. Exch. Comm’n., Remarks Before the Consumer Federation of America’s
Financial Services Conference (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2011/spch120111rk.htm (suggesting that, absent the arrangement, there “would be
longer delays before victims get compensated, the expenditure of SEC resources that
could be spent stopping the next fraud, and—quite possibly—less money in the pock-
ets of wronged investors. And we’d lose the certainty that the victims would actually
get compensation.”). Cf. Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F.
Supp. 2d 304, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“For now, however, the S.E.C.’s practice of permit-
ting defendants to neither admit nor deny the charges against them remains perva-
sive, presumably for no better reason than that it makes the settling of cases easier.”).
165 See, e.g., Joshua A. Naftalis, Note, “Wells Submissions” to the SEC as Offers of Settle-
ment Under Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and Their Protection From Third-Party Discovery, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1912, 1922 (2002) (noting the importance of settlements to the Com-
mission); THE ECONOMIST, supra note 8 (“By settling, the SEC guarantees a good-
enough result. It collects money. . . The regulators can claim victory in press releases
and self-congratulatory reports to Congress.”); see also S.E.C. FY 2011 REPORT, supra
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In the BofA matter, Judge Rakoff seized on the “cynical” na-
ture of the bargain between the Commission and an investigative
target, characterizing that arrangement as one in which the Com-
mission can claim that it is exposing wrongdoing in a high-profile
merger, while the target simultaneously claims coercion.166 “And
all this is done at the expense, not only of the shareholders, but
also of the truth.”167 Many have echoed this cynical view.168 Com-
menting on the BofA case, one commentator observed that, in
light of the recent spate of scandals, “the inference is unavoidable
that the commission wanted to announce a seemingly tough settle-
ment in a high-profile case, as part of its understandable campaign
to re-establish itself as the tough cop of Wall Street.”169 The wisdom
of a policy encouraging these bargains becomes more suspect in
the case where the corporate management negotiating a potential
settlement is composed of the same managers involved in the al-
leged wrongdoing.170
SEC civil enforcement actions follow a predictable rhythm. In
the normal case, if the Commission approves the recommendation
of its staff to file a civil action, the staff drafts and files a complaint
with a U.S. District Court.171 Typically, pleadings are followed by
“discovery, including interrogatories, depositions, documentary
discovery, and motion practice,” culminating in a hearing or
trial.172 Settlements can be reached at any time in this process and
are initiated and negotiated in an opaque process beyond the pub-
lic record.173 Undoubtedly, “[a]ll settlements are negotiated reso-
note 163, at 2 (“Despite funding constraints, SEC staff worked diligently to build an
agency whose ability to support capital markets and protect investors large and small
continued to improve.”).
166 Lawrence Chu & David J. Berger, Federal District Court Rejects Proposed Consent
Judgment between Bank of America and the SEC, WSGR ALERT, (Wilson Sonsini Goodrich
& Rosati, Palo Alto, C.A.) (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.wsgr.com/publications
/pdfsearch/wsgralert_bank_of_america.pdf.
167 See Bank of America Opinion I, 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
168 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The End of Phony Deterrence? ‘SEC v. Bank of America’,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 17, 2009; Sheehan, supra note 2; Cassidy, supra note 2.
169 Coffee, supra note 168.
170 See, e.g., Bank of America Opinion I, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 510:
It is one thing for management to exercise its business judgment to de-
termine how much of its shareholders money should be used to settle a
case brought by former shareholders or third parties. It is quite some-
thing else for the very management that is accused of having lied to its
shareholders to determine how much of those victims’ money should be
used to make the case against the management go away.
171 Johnson, supra note 101, at 644.
172 Dreilinger, supra note 16, at 9.
173 Id.
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lutions in which both parties agree to a compromise outcome
instead of obtaining every element of relief or sanction that may
have been sought.”174
In a recent speech, the Commission’s former Director of En-
forcement, Robert Khuzami, defended the Commission’s work and
outlined the specific process by which decisions are made to strike
a compromise with a defendant:
When the Division of Enforcement recommends that the Com-
mission settle a case, it is because our informed judgment tells
us that what we are obtaining in settlement is within the range
of outcomes we reasonably can expect to get after we prevail at
trial, taking into account the strength of the case as well as the
delay and resources required for a trial and the benefits of re-
turning money to harmed investors quickly—not to mention the
chances that we might lose at trial, or win but be awarded less
than what the settlement achieves.175
While individual settlements are, no doubt, the work of a dedi-
cated group of skilled, honest and professional personnel at the
SEC and the result of a deliberative process, the reality remains
that the Commission has ample motivation to settle the large ma-
jority of its cases. The fact that, today, settlements represent the
preferred SEC enforcement method only serves to enhance the
need for careful examination of the legitimacy of individual SEC
settlements.176
The primary factors weighing in favor of the routine settle-
ment of cases come in two main flavors. First, the reality of the
Commission’s economics dictates that the conservation of its re-
sources plays an integral role in its decision making.177 Second, the
threat of reputational harm that can result from a loss at trial is a
significant motivator in favor of settlements.178 Invariably, the Com-
mission’s support and bargaining strength are enhanced through
aggressive and successful settlement activity.179 Very crudely, the
Commission would most likely prefer settlements with many to full-
fledged trials with a few.180
Chief among the many pressures that the Commission must
174 Khuzami, supra note 164.
175 Id.
176 Johnson, supra note 101, at 669.
177 See generally id. at 671.
178 See generally id.
179 See generally id.
180 Cf. Coffee, supra note 168 (“[T]he SEC has to be prepared to litigate (and not
reflexively settle). Ultimately, this dilemma may require that the SEC bring fewer
cases in order to be able to litigate more intensively those that it does bring.”).
80 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:51
navigate is the economic reality that the Commission faces in carry-
ing out its mission. Simply put, the Commission’s task is massive.
Today, the Commission employs approximately 3,844 people and
has responsibility for the regulation of over 35,000 individual enti-
ties.181 And, as many have observed, the Commission has neither
the staff nor the funding to litigate every enforcement action.182 In
an effort to conserve resources, staff attorneys are routinely in-
structed to prioritize cases that have important public policy impli-
cations, or are necessary to send important signals to regulated
industries and entities.183 Factors unrelated to a case’s strength,
therefore, routinely affect the Commission’s decision making pro-
cess with regard to individual settlements.
Apart from economic concerns, the Commission’s settlement
decisions are also influenced by the agency’s important reputa-
tional concerns.184 Enforcement actions have traditionally defined
the mission of the agency.185 It is clear that the Commission is
largely evaluated on the basis of how well its Division of Enforce-
ment performs.186 Today, the Commission’s bargaining strength is
founded, in part, on its successful history and the perception that it
only pursues winnable cases resulting from effective investigations.
Losing a high-profile case, therefore, may substantially compro-
mise the entire enforcement program of the Commission.187 And,
181 See S.E.C. FY 2011 REPORT, supra note 163, at 9.
182 See, e.g., Khuzami, supra note 164:
[L]itigation requires resources, lots of resources. And we are an agency
on a modest budget.
Trials are time-consuming and the agency spends a great deal of money
deposing witnesses, producing exhibits, and arguing motions.
And our opponents are well-armed with teams of expensive lawyers – a
single company could spend an amount on its defense equal to half or
more of our Division’s entire annual operating budget.
A settlement conserves our resources and allows us to redirect them in
productive ways.
Id.
183 Dreilinger, supra note 16, at 11.
184 Id.
185 John Sivolella, Bureaucratic Decision Making—SEC Enforcement and the Federal
Courts’ Ideology 29 (Apr. 2007) (unpublished), www.allacademic.com/meta/
p196843_index.html; see also Macey, supra note 25, at 644 (arguing that the SEC “fo-
cuses on the raw number of cases that it brings and on the sheer size of the fines that
it collects”).
186 Macey, supra note 25, at 643.
187 See, e.g., Khuzami, supra note 164:
We also have to consider the risks associated with litigation, including
that cases are won and lost on subtle concepts of materiality, intent, and
the meaning of a single sentence in a 500-page offering document.
Litigation also takes time. Some judges move their dockets along rap-
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the cost of a Commission loss at trial is borne by both the Commis-
sion and the public at large. Successful defendants do not gener-
ally leave the trial process unscathed either, with significant
damage often affecting reputation and purse, despite the ultimate
victory on the merits.
In theory, the Commission’s “public interest” mandate serves
as a check on the types of settlements that the Commission can
agree to, and, more generally, on the entire settlement negotiation
process.188 Reference to this public interest mission is noticeably
absent, however, from many of the Commission’s recent public
statements regarding its consent judgment practice. Increasingly,
the courts are taking up the public interest mantle, and the debate
is shifting to just how deeply a court can investigate the public in-
terest implications of an individual settlement proposed for its
approval.
III. THE PROPER DEFERENCE TO BE ACCORDED THE SEC
In approving settlements, courts are given wide judicial discre-
tion, limited only by “notions of reasonableness and deference.”189
Confronted with a proposed consent judgment from a federal
agency, however, courts are constrained in the scope of their in-
quiry.190 In particular, the law requires that courts “give substantial
deference to the SEC as the regulatory body having primary re-
idly, but in other cases—real cases that we have in fact litigated—it can
take years before a case sees the inside of a courtroom, and more years
before all appeals are exhausted.
A settlement removes the uncertainty and puts money in the pockets of
investors relatively quickly.
Id.
188 See, e.g., Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d
328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (commenting that the SEC “of all agencies” has “a duty,
inherent in its statutory mission to see that truth emerges”). The efficacy of the public
interest mandate, however, is far from certain. As one commentator has observed:
[T]heoretically, the SEC’s settlement negotiations are guided by its
mandate to enforce the federal securities laws in the public interest. Yet,
what constitutes actions in the ‘public interest’ is largely undefined,
leaving the Commission staff to engage in what one former SEC attor-
ney describes as an ‘arbitrary exercise’ that may be influenced by inter-
nal and external pressures such as public policy concerns, the overall
political climate, and agency self-interest.
Dreilinger, supra note 16, at 10.
189 Henderson, supra note 3, at 4.
190 See, e.g., Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Unless a
consent decree is unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable, it ought to be approved.”).
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sponsibility for policing the securities markets.”191 Such an ap-
proach is consistent with a philosophy that courts asked to pass on
the judgment of executive agencies must do so with less informa-
tion, expertise, and political oversight than the agencies.192 As one
author recently commented:
In the case of settlements, a court asked to approve a consent
decree is not privy to (i) the details of the alleged wrongdoing,
(ii) the intricacies of the negotiation between the parties, (iii)
the facts of how the settlement or the litigation will affect the
parties, (iv) the costs and benefits of proceeding with the case,
or (v) how the settlement will affect other parties.193
On the one hand, the court must satisfy its own judicial needs
and should be reluctant to assert its authority absent a proper artic-
ulation of the underlying conduct. At the same time, however,
proper deference should be afforded the administrative agency
charged with carrying out the affairs over which it is expert. And,
these issues might be best addressed separately. First, the ability to
craft the specific terms of any settlement seems squarely within the
Commission’s bailiwick and principles of deference would require
the court to grant the Commission significant latitude to tailor the
arrangement with an individual investigative target. When the
Commission desires to employ the court as its enforcer, however, it
is equally appropriate that the bar be raised. In such a case, the
Commission wishes to involve the court in an ongoing effort. Such
an undertaking should not be engaged without a court’s true un-
derstanding of the underlying facts that give rise to the need for its
might. To ask a sentinel to stand post absent the proper knowledge
of just what he is guarding seems as improper as it is illogical. Ac-
cordingly, a district court must retain the exercise of its “indepen-
dent judgment in assessing whether the proposed consent
judgment accords with the public interest, not least because con-
cern for the public interest is not meaningfully severable from the
required consideration of the consent judgment’s fairness, reason-
ableness, and adequacy.”194
While each of the cases examined in this Article has unique
facts and circumstances, there is a clear theme to the objections
191 See Bank of America Opinion II, 09 CIV. 6829 (JSR), 2010 WL 624581, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010).
192 Henderson, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that “[d]eference to the executive branch
that negotiates the settlement on behalf of the public is consistent with judicial defer-
ence to executive agencies generally”).
193 Id.
194 See SEC Brief, supra note 12, at 46.
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that Judge Rakoff raises. In essence, a court’s work must navigate
the choppy waters of (i) a Constitutional issue of separation of
powers and (ii) a question of the proper level of inquiry required
to establish that a settlement it ratifies is fair, reasonable, adequate
and in the public interest. Each such issue is examined in this Part.
A. The Separation of Powers Concern
A deferential role for courts in evaluating consent judgments
negotiated by government agencies finds root in the United States
Constitution.195 The decision whether and what to prosecute is an
exclusively executive function.196 And, by settling a matter, the re-
spective parties signal their assent to extinguish the ongoing case
or controversy that is the very prerequisite for a district court’s ju-
risdiction under the Constitution.197
Increasingly, the Commission has emphasized the need for its
deliberate balancing of all of the many factors that affect its settle-
ment decisions. In large measure, the Commission views itself as
the expert charged with managing the public interest through the
overall decision making involved in all of its many enforcement
activities. With such a broad task, it is not sufficient for the Com-
mission to come to a conclusion that a particular transgression was
serious enough to warrant a suit. Instead, the agency must measure
whether “the costs of pursuing the suit were greater than any bene-
fits in terms of deterrence or compensation that might flow from
pursuing it further.”198 And, how can the Commission’s subjective
and holistic decision be second-guessed by a court that lacks a win-
dow into all of the agency’s activities? Only the Commission seems
properly equipped to understand the requirements of a specific
case within a complete portfolio of all of its endeavors and
constraints.
195 SEC Memorandum of Law, supra note 83, at 8; see United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting the “constitutional difficulties that
inhere” in judicial review of settlements for compliance with the “public interest”);
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 1005–06 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
from summary affirmance) (explaining the separation of powers problems created by
a “public interest” judicial review of consent decrees).
196 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s decision not to
prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision gener-
ally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”).
197 SEC Memorandum of Law, supra note 83, at 8 (citing Matter of S.L.E., Inc., 674
F.2d 359, 364 (5th Cir. 1982) (“If a dispute has been settled or resolved . . . it is
considered moot. With the designation of mootness comes the concomitant designa-
tion of non-justiciability.”).
198 Henderson, supra note 3, at 6.
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The benefits of allowing the Commission to control the con-
sent decree process, including the decision of whether to enter
into such arrangements on a “non-admission/non-denial” basis
seem clear:
While it gives up a number of advantages when it proceeds by
injunction rather than by litigation, including the filing of find-
ings of fact and court opinions clearly setting forth the reasons
for the result in a particular case, the SEC is thus able to con-
serve its own and judicial resources; to obtain contempt reme-
dies, including fines and prison terms, not available to it under
its own statutory scheme; and to protect the public by informing
potential investors that a certain person has violated SEC rules
in the past and by reminding defendants that they must obey
the law in the future. While the defendants in such cases give up
the right to contest the need for an injunction, they receive sig-
nificant benefits in return: they are permitted to settle the com-
plaint against them without admitting or denying the SEC’s
allegations and they often seek and receive concessions concern-
ing the violations to be alleged in the complaint, the language
and factual allegations in the complaint, and the collateral, ad-
ministrative consequences of the consent decree. We are reluc-
tant to upset this balance of advantages and disadvantages.199
Accordingly, the Commission maintains that consent judg-
ments resulting from arm’s-length negotiations between sophisti-
cated parties are entitled to a presumption of reasonableness by
the reviewing court.200 And, the presumption is heightened where
the consent judgment is the result of an enforcement effort by a
federal government agency responsible for ensuring the “mainte-
nance of fair and honest markets.”201 The Commission maintains
that its overall settlement strategies and its “neither admit nor
deny” policy, in particular, are necessary to facilitate settlements
that “preserve the breadth of its enforcement reach.”202 In essence,
the Commission’s view is that it must be free from judicial intru-
sion in the negotiation of its settlements with investigative targets.
And, only in such a regime can the aims of the Commission be
accomplished and more money returned to wronged investors
more quickly.
In a public statement in response to a court’s refusal to accept
the Citigroup settlement, the Commission’s former Director of En-
199 S.E.C. v. Clifton, 700 F.2d 744, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
200 See, e.g., SEC Memo of Law, supra note 83, at 1. See also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 116 (2d Cir. 2005).
201 Necessity for Regulation, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2010).
202 Reckler & Denton, supra note 119, at 4.
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forcement, Robert Khuzami, echoed the sentiments of the Clifton
court and emphasized the involved and thorough nature of the
Commission’s deliberations. Mr. Khuzami suggested that to turn
down settlements simply because they lacked an admission would
represent an unwise policy. He further stated:
The court’s criticism that the settlement does not require an
‘admission’ to wrongful conduct disregards the fact that ob-
taining disgorgement, monetary penalties, and mandatory busi-
ness reforms may significantly outweigh the absence of an
admission when that relief is obtained promptly and without the
risks, delay, and resources required at trial. It also ignores de-
cades of established practice throughout federal agencies and
decisions of the federal courts. Refusing an otherwise advanta-
geous settlement solely because of the absence of an admission
also would divert resources away from the investigation of other
frauds and the recovery of losses suffered by other investors not
before the court.203
Understandably, Mr. Khuzami’s public statement embellishes
Judge Rakoff’s position. In fact, in all three cases, the Judge is care-
ful to establish that the lack of an admission is not the sole factor
informing his agitation.204 Moreover, he concedes that a reviewing
court must tread lightly because deference is, indeed, due the work
of the Commission. Instead, the Judge’s objections concern the
fact that the court’s powers are requested, in each case, without a
full and proper showing of the facts giving rise to such a need.
Again, the argument is around the level of deference that a court
must show the Commission and not whether a court’s power is ab-
solute. For Judge Rakoff, then, the issue is one of line drawing and
not one of whether there exists a line.205 And, ultimately, it is the
“public interest” prong of the inquiry that affords the court its wid-
est latitude to meddle.
Just as the Commission has an interest in protecting and de-
fending its proper role within an independent executive branch, so
too do the courts have ample reason to assert the constitutional
203 Robert Khuzami, Former Director, Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. Exch.
Comm’n., Court’s Refusal to Approve Settlement in Citigroup Case (Nov. 28, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch112811rk.htm.
204 Bank of America Opinion I, 653 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Sec. Exch.
Comm’n. v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Sec.
Exch. Comm’n. v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
205 SEC Brief, supra note 12, at 54 (“As the district court stated over and over, it
simply lacked any factual basis upon which to determine whether the settlement was
fair, reasonable, adequate, or in the public interest.”).
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independence of the federal judiciary in these types of disputes.
“[O]ur Constitution unambiguously enunciates a fundamental
principle–that the ‘judicial Power of the United States’ must be re-
posed in an independent Judiciary.”206 As the pro bono counsel
appointed to represent Judge Rakoff in the Citigroup appeal ar-
gued, “[d]epriving the district court of its capacity to reach a sound
and reasoned judgment regarding the propriety of a proposed con-
sent judgment and the imposition of injunctive relief would under-
mine the judiciary’s independence and thereby threaten the
constitutional balance of power.”207
B. The Public Interest Concern
In large part, any proper “public interest” inquiry cannot be
divorced from the question of the proper deference that need be
afforded the Commission. Is the Commission the ultimate arbiter
of public interest within its general charge to maintain the integrity
of the federal securities markets? Or, is that task subject to the sec-
ond-guessing of a court that lacks the full picture of the Commis-
sion’s overall activities?208 As a practical matter, a court’s public
interest review cannot be severable from the reasonable, fair and
adequate prongs of a proper judicial inquiry. For, as Judge Rakoff
reminds, it is the public and the parties to whom reasonableness,
adequacy, and fairness are owed.209
Yet, of the attacks on the SEC’s consent judgment practice of-
fered by Judge Rakoff over the course of the three cases, the “pub-
lic interest” concern might be the most stinging. The issue comes
to a head in the Citigroup dispute and, then, as a result of a substan-
tial backpedalling on the part of the Commission. In fact, the Com-
mission’s inconsistent approach to the threshold required to
establish “public interest” suggests a certain level of intellectual
confusion as these cases have evolved. In the Bank of America case,
for example, the court offered very little discussion of public inter-
est.210 In the initial rejection of the consent judgment, the court
discredited the proposed settlement for its lack of fairness, reason-
206 See N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982).
207 SEC Brief, supra note 12, at 55; see also United States v. Rojas, 53 F.3d 1212, 1214
(11th Cir. 1995) (“[S]eparation of powers would be implicated when the actions of
another Branch threaten an Article III court’s independence and impartiality in the
execution of its decisionmaking function.”).
208 See Dreilinger, supra note 16, at 6 (“Allowing judges to embark on a searching
public interest inquiry for every single SEC settlement could harm the SEC, defend-
ants, and even the courts.”).
209 Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335.
210 See supra text accompanying notes 41–42.
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ableness and adequacy “even upon applying the most deferential
standard of review.”211 As a result, any public interest inquiry re-
mained extraneous, and the court did not have to involve itself in
such an inquiry to find the proposal objectionable.
In the Vitesse case, the Commission’s brief articulated the
proper standard for the court to apply in determining whether to
approve consent judgments in SEC enforcement actions. In fact,
Judge Rakoff’s opinion quoted liberally from the Commission’s
submission.212 Characterizing the scope of the court’s review as
“well established”, the Commission wrote that “[b]ecause actions
brought by the Commission seek to enforce the federal securities
laws, they should serve the ‘public interest.’”213 The Commission
further elaborated that, to ensure that the public interest is served,
the court:
[N]eed not inquire into the precise legal rights of the parties
nor reach and resolve the merits of the claims or controversy,
but need only determine that the settlement is fair, adequate,
reasonable and appropriate under the particular facts and that
there has been a valid consent by the parties.214
The Commission’s brief quoted from the language of the earlier
Bank of America opinion, providing that the Vitesse court had “the
obligation, within carefully prescribed limits, to determine whether
the proposed Consent Judgment settling [a] case is fair, reasona-
ble, adequate, and in the public interest.”215 Finally, the standard
of review suggested by the Commission and adopted by the Vitesse
court provided that the court “give substantial deference to the
SEC as the regulatory body having primary responsibility for polic-
ing the securities markets, especially with respect to matters of
transparency.”216
In the Citigroup matter, however, the SEC tried another stan-
dard on for size. While retaining the “fair, adequate, and reasona-
ble” language articulated in Bank of America and Vitesse, the
Commission’s memorandum reversed course from its filings in the
211 Bank of America Opinion I, 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
212 Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
213 Id. at 306 (referencing SEC Letter Brief dated Dec. 21, 2010, which cites Sec.
Exch. Comm’n. v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984)).
214 See id. (citing Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1126 (D.C.
Cir. 1983)).
215 See id. at 307 (quoting Bank of America Opinion II, No. 09-CV-6829 (JSR), 2009
WL 2842940, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2009)).
216 See id. (quoting Bank of America Opinion II, No. 09-CV-6829 (JSR), 10 Civ. 0215
(JSR), 2010 WL 5624581, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010)).
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prior cases, and suggested that “the public interest . . . is not part of
[the] applicable standard of review.”217 Ultimately, the question of
whether the court possesses the ability to inquire into whether a
settlement placed before it is in the public interest is barely worthy
of a discussion. And, the Commission’s efforts to walk back from its
own articulation of such a standard only serves to hurt the credibil-
ity of its efforts to define the scope of such an inquiry.
The more interesting question than whether there exists a
public interest inquiry within the proper scope of judicial review is
just how robust such a review should be and where its boundaries
should be drawn. In essence, where a public interest inquiry ends
and proper deference for the Commission begins becomes the
question of the day in these cases. For, as one commentator has
observed, “government agencies with missions, policies, and en-
forcement tools similar to the SEC have utilized a public interest
inquiry to facilitate—and even improve—the settlement
process.”218
Any position in favor of enhanced judicial review for securities
settlements suffers mightily from the absence of statutory guidance
on what constitutes a settlement consistent with the public inter-
est.219 The courts, too, have not yet developed a consistent test or
set of factors to support a meaningful public interest inquiry.220 As
a result, judges are left to navigate a vague mandate in favor of
consent judgments.221
Over time, ad hoc judicial inquiries for individual settlements
could do more harm than good. It is not difficult to imagine that a
commission that relies on the settlement process to resolve more
than 90% of its enforcement actions might strain under an addi-
tional burden if defendants are discouraged from undergoing the
intense, lengthy, and costly bargaining process with the Commis-
sion only to have judges enforce their own requirements or reject a
proposed settlement altogether.222  Of course, in an effort to save
time and resources, the Commission might choose to avoid the
courts altogether.223
217 Opinion and Order at 5, Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.,
No. 11 Civ. 7387 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2011).
218 Dreilinger, supra note 16, at 29.
219 Id. at 6.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 6–7.
223 Id. at 7 (noting that this option “is especially attractive given the Commission’s
recently acquired power to impose civil monetary penalties ‘against any person’ in
administrative proceedings”).
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In the coming days and years, the courts, the Commission, and
individual defendants will be left to define the scope of the proper
inquiry for the court. In that regard, Judge Rakoff has done a real
service to begin a process of defining these roles that should have
started long ago.
IV. THE LIKELY EFFECTS OF THE NEWFOUND ATTENTION
A few years removed from the Bank of America matter, some
effects of Judge Rakoff’s crusade are already taking hold. First, and
predictably, the Commission has responded aggressively to charges
leveled at the way that it does its business. Most notably, the merits
of the defense of its practices are likely to be considered in the
Commission’s appeal of the Citigroup decision. Second, if imitation
remains the greatest form of flattery, Judge Rakoff has enjoyed his
share of adulation. The Judge’s fans are not limited to the press,
academics, and commentators. Other judges have shown various
degrees of support for this line of thought, as the Commission is
being asked to satisfy specific court-directed inquiries like no time
in recent memory.224 A position in favor of enhanced judicial scru-
tiny, however, today remains vacuous because the “public interest”
standard remains relatively undefined. And, the success of any such
policy will depend on a careful weighing of the costs and benefits
of such an approach. Finally, once these matters become better
settled, and the appellate courts have more clearly articulated the
appropriate standards of review, there is likely to be an effect in the
market for directors and officers insurance. Some of the likely ef-
fects of the newfound attention that Judge Rakoff has brought to
these issues are briefly explored below.
A. The Citigroup Appeal
On December 15, 2011, the Commission filed a Notice of Ap-
peal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
224 See, e.g., Letter from Hon. Rudolph T. Randa, U.S. District Judge, to Andrea R.
Wood & James A. Davidson, Counsel for SEC (Dec. 20, 2011), available at www.wlrk.
com/docs/kossletter.pdf (refusing to approve a proposed settlement between the
SEC and Koss Corporation and directing the Commission to show that the settlement
is fair, reasonable, and in the public interest); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n. v. Circa
Direct, No. 11-civ-2172, 2012 WL 589560 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2012) (challenging a settle-
ment of alleged violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act and ordering the
parties to submit briefs responding to whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and in
the public interest); Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Merendon Mining (Nevada) Inc., No.
C10-955RAJ (W.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 2012) (rejecting a proposed settlement between the
SEC and three alleged Ponzi scheme defendants and taking issue with the SEC re-
quest for injunctive relief while reserving decisions on monetary relief for the future).
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seeking review of Judge Rakoff’s November 28th Order in the Ci-
tigroup matter. In addition, on December 16, 2011, the bank filed a
motion in the district court seeking to stay the proceedings pend-
ing the appeal.225 In support of the appeal, former Enforcement
Director Khuzami again took the opportunity to defend the Com-
mission’s proposed settlement as “reasonably reflect[ing]the relief
the SEC would likely have obtained if it prevailed at trial.”226 He
also characterized Judge Rakoff’s approach as contrary to legal au-
thority and “at odds with decades of court decisions that have up-
held similar settlements by federal and state agencies across the
country.”227 With the appeal moving to the Second Circuit, there
remained an interesting question of whether Judge Rakoff’s posi-
tion would be represented (aside from the record in the District
Court) in a proceeding that amounted to “basically an appeal with-
out an adversary.”228 That question was answered in the affirmative
when the Second Circuit allowed for the appointment of pro bono
counsel to represent and brief Judge Rakoff’s position.229 The case
was heard by the Second Circuit on February 8, 2013.230
B. The Copycat Effect
Several recent cases suggest that the importance of Judge
Rakoff’s decisions will be found less in the resolution of any partic-
ular matter than with the change in the approach that the judiciary
might take to pre-packaged SEC settlements.231  On several occa-
sions since Judge Rakoff first expressed his reservations, individual
225 Citigroup subsequently filed its own Notice of Appeal and Memorandum in
Support of the Stay Motion.
226 SEC Enforcement Director’s Statement on the Citigroup Case, SEC News Digest, Issue
2011-241 (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/2011/dig121511.htm.
227 Id.
228 For an interesting description of this unlikely situation and some possible out-
comes see Carolyn Kolker, Analysis: In Citi Appeal, Who Will Speak for Rakoff?, REUTERS
(Jan. 17, 2012, 5:20 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/17/us-frankel-
rakoff-idUSTRE80G28Q20120117.
229 See Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 161 (2d
Cir. 2012).
230 See Peter Lattman, Court Hears Arguments on Judge’s Rejection of S.E.C.-Citigroup
Deal, DEALBOOK BLOG (Feb. 8, 2013, 4:56 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/
02/08/appeals-court-hears-arguments-over-judge-rakoffs-rejection-of-citigroup-settle
ment/.
231 See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, In Challenging S.E.C. Settlement, a Judge in Wisconsin Cites a
Court in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/
business/judge-in-wisconsin-challenges-sec-settlement.html?_r=0 (“The fact that a fed-
eral judge halfway across the country cited the [Citigroup] case less than a month later
means that other judges have noticed the ruling—which is significant because most
S.E.C. enforcement cases rely on similar, negotiated settlements.”).
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judges have agreed that the settlement practice should require
more than a judicial rubber stamp.
One commentator has summarized the effects of the Bank of
America case and its progeny succinctly:
By echoing the concerns that arose in Bank of America, these
judges gave credence to Judge Rakoff’s over-arching criticisms
of the SEC settlement process and showed that Judge Rakoff was
more than a publicity-hungry gadfly.  In fact, as more judges
‘pull a Rakoff’ and break with the long-entrenched tradition of
judicial deference, Bank of America becomes more interesting—
and important.  Judge Rakoff’s decision will not be remembered
for the outcome of the case, but rather how it sparked a new
trend of judicial scrutiny for securities settlements.232
The newfound judicial scrutiny has come from several corners.
In March 2010, for example, Judge William Pauley, of the South-
ern District of New York, rejected a Commission proposal to
amend the historic global settlement that brokerage firms agreed
to following the much celebrated conflicts of interest inquiries in
2003.233 Labeling the proposed amendment “counterintuitive,”
Judge Pauley found it to be contrary to the public interest, despite
the Commission’s endorsement.234 In August 2010, Judge Ellen S.
Huvelle, of the D.C. Circuit, refused to “rubber-stamp” the Com-
mission’s proposed settlement with Citigroup over the bank’s fail-
ure to fully disclose its exposure to subprime mortgages during the
recent financial crisis.235 Judge Huvelle raised significant questions
about the proposed $75 million settlement and her concerns “mir-
rored Judge Rakoff’s.”236
Judge Rakoff’s most recent kindred spirit seems to be Judge
Rudolph T. Randa of the District Court of the Eastern District of
Wisconsin. Upon being presented with a proposed settlement of
fraud charges against Koss Corporation, a maker of stereo head-
232 Dreilinger, supra note 16, at 5–6.
233 See Ashby Jones, In Rejecting SEC Settlement, Has Pauley Pulled a Rakoff?, WALL ST.
J. LAW BLOG (Mar. 18, 2010, 12:58 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/03/18/in-
rejecting-sec-settlement-has-pauley-pulled-a-rakoff/.
234 See generally Peter J. Henning, When Judges Refuse to Be Rubber Stamps, DEALBOOK
BLOG (Mar. 22, 2010, 12:33 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/22/
when-judges-refuse-to-be-rubber-stamps/.
235 See Peter J. Henning, Can the S.E.C. Avoid Scrutiny of its Settlements?, DEALBOOK
BLOG (Aug. 17, 2010, 5:18 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/17/
can-the-s-e-c-avoid-scrutiny-of-its-settlements/ (noting that one day later, albeit in a
criminal case brought by the Department of Justice, another federal judge asked
tough questions about what he viewed as a “sweetheart deal” with Barclays Capital,
before he reluctantly approved the settlement).
236 See Schreiber et al., supra note 108, at 2, n.3.
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phones, the Judge cited Judge Rakoff’s Citigroup opinion and asked
the Commission to provide a “written factual predicate for why it
believes the court should find that the proposed final judgments
are fair, reasonable, adequate and in the public interest.”237
C. Costs and Benefits
At least one commentator has suggested a more practical lens
through which the Commission’s actions in these cases might be
viewed.  Describing the Bank of America case in particular, Professor
Henderson offered the following assessment:
Imagine that the SEC believed that the disclosures in the proxy
statement were faulty and misleading, but that the circum-
stances of the deal were such that the mistakes were not worthy
of aggressive punishment. (Perhaps because the executives at
Bank of America were pressured into doing the deal as a public
service to “save” the economy from collapse.) Accordingly, we
can think of the suit and the settlement as telling shareholders
that they were paying for the mistakes their agents made, per-
haps hoping that shareholders would, either through lawsuit or
otherwise, try to discipline those agents. Seen in this way, the
apparent accommodation that the SEC made could instead be
viewed as a rational calculation of the costs and benefits of the
litigation and a pursuit of something approximating optimal de-
terrence of future proxy violations.238
Under such an interpretation, Judge Rakoff’s efforts can be
seen as “piling on to some extent,” as, in a sense, they uproot the
delicate balance of the Commission’s value judgments.239 By re-
jecting the settlements, Judge Rakoff suggests that “the SEC was
systematically making errors about the tradeoffs in the deterrence
calculation.”240 While we can hold out hope that Judge Rakoff’s
decisions will cause the SEC to be more thoughtful and delibera-
tive in its efforts, it adds to the uncertainty of the entire settlement
process. A less optimistic view is that the Judge’s efforts will simply
raise the costs of entering consent judgments.241
Presumably the SEC prefers to use consent decrees in cases like
this because they are the most efficient way to enforce the terms
237 See Letter from Hon. Rudolph T. Randa, U.S. District Judge, to Andrea R. Wood
& James A. Davidson, Counsel for SEC, Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Koss Corp., No. 2:11-
CV-00991 (E.D. Wisc. Dec. 20, 2011), available at www.wlrk.com/docs/file/kossletter.
pdf; see also Wyatt, supra note 231.
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of the agreement. By raising the costs of this alternative to pure
settlements, which definitely do not require judicial approval,
the options for the government and the parties are reduced.
This in turn reduces the range of mutually beneficial bargains
that can be struck, and may result in much higher costs for all
other parties.242
D. The Effect on the Insurance Market
Few would argue that the added opacity surrounding SEC en-
forcement proceedings in the wake of Judge Rakoff’s efforts “will
affect the costs of defense for SEC enforcement proceedings and
impact defense and settlement costs for related shareholder class
actions and derivative litigation.”243 In particular, the underwriters
of directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance have undoubtedly
taken notice of the evolving landscape, and will be anxiously moni-
toring the ongoing controversy surrounding the Commission’s set-
tlement policy.
Typically, SEC settlements themselves are uninsurable under
D&O policies because they usually include fines, disgorgement,
and equitable relief.244 The costs of defending an SEC investiga-
tion, however, are generally recoverable under a D&O policy.245
Some observers who follow the insurance market have suggested
that if Judge Rakoff’s criticisms ultimately result in a change in SEC
policy where the Commission will only enter into settlements with
defendants who admit liability, there will be a corresponding
change in the insurance market. “If defendants cannot settle with
the SEC without admitting liability, there likely will be fewer settle-
ments and some defendants may decide to litigate until a final
judgment—all resulting in increased costs of defense.”246 Accord-
ingly, those in the insurance field are monitoring these issues
closely.
E. Changes to Criminal Cases at the Commission
One measurable effect of Judge Rakoff’s critique is found in a
recently announced change to Commission policy.247 On January
6, 2012, the Commission, through its Director of Enforcement, an-
242 Id.
243 Pesso, supra note 59.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id. (noting that “[i]n recent years, defense costs for even a single SEC defendant
have run into the millions of dollars”).
247 See generally Aruna Viswanatha & Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Changes Settlement Lan-
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nounced that defendants are now prohibited from settling civil
cases using the “neither admit nor deny” language if they have al-
ready admitted to wrongdoing in a parallel criminal case.248 Under
the new policy, where a defendant is the subject of a parallel crimi-
nal conviction, non-prosecution agreement (“NPA”) or deferred
prosecution agreement (“DPA”) that contains admissions or
acknowledgements of criminal conduct, the SEC will no longer
permit that defendant to enter into a “non-admission/non-denial”
style settlement. Instead of the traditional charging language, Com-
mission settlement orders will now include language citing the fact
and nature of the criminal disposition.249 In addition, the Commis-
sion’s staff will have the discretion to incorporate into the settle-
ment order any relevant facts admitted during the defendant’s plea
allocution, in a jury verdict form, or in the NPA or DPA.250
The Commission, through its Director of Enforcement, has ex-
pressly denied that there is a connection between Judge Rakoff’s
opinions and the policy change. While the new policy represents
an additional consideration for a prospective settling party, the
practical impact of the change is likely to be modest for several
reasons. First, the new policy does not apply to the vast majority of
settling parties.251 In this regard, it is limited to situations where
the defendant has (i) pled guilty, (ii) been convicted, or (iii) made
substantive admissions in an NPA or DPA.252 Second, the new pol-
icy is somewhat limited in that settling parties are not required to
make admissions beyond the scope of what they had already made
in a criminal proceeding. The policy merely calls for the inclusion
of language that “the defendant has admitted the parallel criminal
action.”253
guage for Some Cases, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2012, 5:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/arti
cle/2012/01/07/us-sec-policychange-idUSTRE8051VB20120107.
248 See Steve Schaefer, SEC Rule Change Doesn’t Mean Much for Wall Street Settlements,
FORBES, Jan. 6, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2012/01/06/sec-
rule-change-wont-have-wall-street-admitting-guilt/ (quoting the full statement by SEC
Director of Enforcement Robert Khuzami outlining the new policy).
249 See Schreiber et al., supra note 108, at 1.
250 See Posting of DavisPolk Client Newsflash, SEC Changes “Neither Admit Nor Deny”
Practice for Criminal Conviction Cases, to dpwmail@davispolk.com (Jan. 9, 2012), http://
www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/2202fc41-1395-49a8-b40f-fa8022c05ac9/Presen
tation/PublicationAttachment/38595d57-62a0-44f6-ba26-0b7f9da97fc0/01.09.12.lit.
html (offering that “[t]he SEC’s newly announced approach is likely to arise most
notably in cases involving the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or insider trading, where
SEC enforcement actions often run parallel to criminal proceedings”).
251 See Reckler & Denton, supra note 119, at 1 (noting that “[t]he vast majority of
SEC cases fit into that unchanged category”).
252 See Schreiber et al., supra note 108, at 2.
253 Id. at 3.
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In the end, despite the Commission’s denials, it is difficult to
maintain a position that this policy change would have happened
absent Judge Rakoff’s more general criticisms.254 Moreover, it re-
mains unclear whether the change will be the beginning of a
broader shift to more aggressive enforcement policies.255
CONCLUSION
The role of the federal judiciary in approving Commission set-
tlements is an important one. Ultimately, defining the scope of
that involvement has significant ramifications for the courts, the
Commission, investigation targets, and the public at large. And
adopting a reliable standard for the proper judicial public interest
inquiry can preserve the utility and efficiency of the Commission’s
settlement process and, at the same time, satisfy the courts’ burden
that its enforcement mechanisms are warranted.
In the meantime, the level of skepticism will continue to filter
into the individual consent judgments that the Commission
presents routinely to the courts. Judge Rakoff’s trilogy has already
changed the equation for the Commission and its targets. Un-
doubtedly, the three cases examined in this Article have shed light
on the cynical nature of a settlement process that, for too long, has
offered a comfortable bargain for the Commission and defendant
alike.256 If the Judge’s handiwork makes the Commission more de-
liberate and thoughtful in its work, that will be a benefit. The cost,
however, must be measured in the increased uncertainty of out-
comes. It remains to be seen just how much a more inquisitive
bench will add to the cost of entering into consent judgments. In
the end, all must guard against these cases amounting to little
more than judicial meddling. Such a limited outcome would be
unfortunate, and would simply push parties “towards less efficient
means of resolving their disputes.”257
254 See, e.g., id.; David Dayen, Rakoff Gets Results: SEC Dropping No-Fault Settlement Lan-
guage in Some Cases, FIREDOGLAKE (Jan. 6, 2012, 12:15 PM), http://news.firedoglake.
com/2012/01/06/rakoff-gets-results-sec-dropping-no-fault-settlement-language-in-
some-cases/ (observing that “[t]his is a first step to stopping this travesty of allowing
companies to get off the hook and pay their way out of fraud violations without even
admitting they did anything wrong,” and further asserting that “this never happens
without the work of Jed Rakoff”).
255 Schreiber et al., supra note 108, at 3.
256 See, e.g. Neal Lipschutz, Rakoff Decision May Be ‘Unprecedented,’ But He’s Still Right,
WALL ST. J LAW BLOG (Dec. 16, 2011, 1:50 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/12/
16/if-rakoff-decision-is-unprecedented-hes-still-right/ (suggesting that Judge Rakoff
was “calling ‘stop’ to a long-standing practice that took expediency too far”).
257 Henderson, supra note 3; see also DavisPolk Client Newsflash, supra note 250
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In the meantime, there can be no denying the observations
made by Judge Rakoff’s diligence and recently echoed by Professor
Coffee:
Too often, the goal of the SEC has been to achieve a settlement
with a defendant that affirms its authority, but makes no sense.
This may be the product of logistical constraints and caseload
pressure, and a partial answer may be to allocate more resources
to the SEC. But the SEC has to be prepared to litigate (and not
reflexively settle). Ultimately, this dilemma may require that the
SEC bring fewer cases in order to be able to litigate more inten-
sively those that it does bring.258
And, the alarmist claims that more rigorous judicial inquiry
somehow equates to the SEC’s enforcement program being ham-
strung by the inability to negotiate future settlements rings hollow
in light of the responsible and deliberative consideration regularly
afforded these matters by district courts and the multiple enforce-
ment options still available to the Commission.259
In the end, no settlement is worth the public’s interest in
knowing the truth.
(“[T]o the extent this and other changes to settlement policies at the SEC and other
federal agencies make matters harder to settle, the number of litigated matters might
increase and parties might begin to experiment with alternate ways to resolve cases.”).
258 Coffee, supra note 168, at 4.
259 See generally SEC Brief, supra note 12, at 53–4.
